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ABSTRACT
This report focuses on four different mechanisms designed to provide marginalized groups in Africa with
improved legislative representation at the national level. These special representation mechanisms include:
proportional representation, guaranteed minority seating, advisory bodies and affirmative gerrymandering1.
These tools appear a beneficial means through which nations may eliminate discrimination, better
safeguard the interests of marginalized people, boost opportunity for political expression and place each
member of society on equal footing.
To situate this discussion in its proper context, the opening section of this paper will explore international
law relating to the right of representation and present arguments both for and against the use of special
representation mechanisms. This is followed by a brief discussion of the myriad problems that arise in
attempting to address or characterize issues relating to marginalized groups in Africa. Turning to an
analysis of the four specific mechanisms, this paper will examine numerous cases of African nations that
have, in theory or practice, sought to employ proportional representation, guaranteed minority seating or
advisory bodies as a means of introducing special representation. In addition, this section will discuss the
function of demarcation, its historical roots, and impact on the political climate. Finally, this paper will
offer some conclusions about the implications of the research and its findings as well as several policy
suggestions. It is my hope that the information in this report will contribute to advancing a more equitable
system of representation and its practical implementation in Africa.
I am humbled by the work of those whose insights fill the pages below.
Introduction
“It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented.
No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it.”2
The legislature is considered the most fundamental arm of democratic governance. In its purest form it
serves to secure the foundations of democracy by translating the will of people into the law of land. At its
core, the legislature is a mirror of society’s soul. The question is how to ensure that the composition of the
legislature and the decisions it makes are a true reflection of the will of all people whom this body is
designed to represent.
Legislative representation generally provides a means for people to express their will through
representatives who bring their constituencies’ “concerns and aspirations” to government decisions and
actions.3 This process pivots on voters electing representatives, who in turn are given authority through the
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electoral process and empowered by the people to make decisions and create laws in their best interests.
This form of governance is understood as being the optimal system, since the only form of democracy more
pure is the system of direct democracy, where every individual has the opportunity to participate directly in
legislative decision making.4 Although perhaps ideal, direct democracy is generally impractical. Therefore,
representative democracy is the next best structure as it ideally provides a form of government whereby
people’s sovereignty is delegated to a body of elected persons who exercise authority for the benefit of the
whole nation.5 Representative democracy relies on compromise whether to resolve conflict6 or design
policies to address the needs of a nation. Arguably in its purest form, representative democracy can
represent marginalized groups and larger populations alike.
Within the context of representational democracy there are a wide range of views concerning how best to
represent marginalized groups in the decision making process. At one end of the spectrum,
consociationalism, Arjund Liphart’s theory, asserts that peaceful coexistence cannot be ensured unless
special constitutional measures recognize the corporate entity of ethnic groups and confer on them the right
to separate representation and participation in public bodies.7 At the opposite end of the pole,
integrationists, promulgate the idea that a political system in which all citizens participate can be created
through incentives for cooperation and electoral laws that encourage inter-ethnic cooperation.8
It should be stated from the outset that the scope of this paper is limited to special mechanisms related to
legislative representation, for practical purposes. This limitation is not meant to discount the merit of nonlegislative special representation tools—such as special ministries, non-governmental organizations,
commissions and workgroups.9 That said special legislative representation, is unique as it specifically
targets the organ whose very raison d’etre is to represent the entire population, as opposed to creating ad
hoc or external structures in the manner of its non-legislative counterparts. With this departure point in
mind, this report takes the position that legislative special representation may play a critical role in
compensating marginalized groups for historical disadvantage and providing them with immediate
opportunities to publicly and actively participate in the same institutions that are accessible to the
mainstream, thereby correcting societal imbalance. Indeed, the introduction of these tools may serve to
effectively incorporate disenfranchised communities in the legislature, thereby potentially strengthening
legislative representation as a whole.
There is a tremendous amount of information within the following pages, and this paper includes the
diverse perspectives of a number of great scholars as well as the author’s own observations. However, this
report is not intended to convey the entire spectrum of thought on the subjects raised herein; rather it is
intended to stimulate discussion, prompt further work in the area and hopefully inspire creative thinking.
Public International Law
Public international law provides the legal foundation for affirmative rights applicable to all human beings.
The roots of human rights, minority rights, the right to be free from discrimination, rights of expression, the
right to self-determination, the right to participation and the right to take part in government can be
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identified in international doctrine.10 The right to equitable representation emerges from these enumerated
rights. 11
The 1945 Charter of the United Nations declared “equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, the
purpose of the international body to be thereby establishing the right to self-determination as a pillar of the
international system.12 Elaborating upon the ideology embedded in the UN Charter, Article 15 of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights specifically asserts the right to participate in public affairs and
government.13 In addition, the UDHR expands the right to self-determination to include the pursuit of
economic, social and cultural development. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both adopted in 1966, expand and
make enforceable the rights initially set forth in the UN Charter and the UDHR. The language in Article 25
of the ICCPR declares that every citizen has the right “to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives,” and “to vote and to be elected”.14 Though it does not mention
minorities per se, it has been argued to the UN Committee on Human Rights that minorities should be read
into the interpretation of this clause as they are understood to be “unrepresented or underrepresented
[persons] in national political processes” due to their systematic exclusion or generally small population.15
This concept was affirmed and is currently encoded in international law. Article 1 of the ICESCR declares
“all people have the right of self-determination”.16
In 1952, international law explicitly recognized “that everyone has the right to take part in the government
of his [or her] country directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives…in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”17
Inspired by Article 27 of the ICCPR, the UN General Assembly passed the 1992 UN Declaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.18 This document
declares that minorities have the right “to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and
pubic life,”19 and “to participate effectively in decisions on the national and where appropriate regional
level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions which they live, in a manner not
incompatible with national legislation”20 Other treaties have more specifically addressed categories of
minorities such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child,21 the Convention (No. 169) concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries22 and the Convention on the Political Rights of
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Women,23 for example. In Article 11, the CRC provides that to comply with CITPTC governments shall
“consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their
representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures
which may affect them directly.” Article 6(a) further supports the notion of the right for marginalized
groups to be politically represented. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination is also fundamental to this discussion insofar as Article 1.4 states:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights
and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however,
that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights
for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.24
This provision has most commonly taken the form of affirmative action policies.25
Article 2.3 of the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities is of particular interest because of the implicit
qualifications it attaches to these positive rights. While the intention of this document is to advance the
rights of marginalized groups, it also serves to potentially isolate such groups by only out provisions to
involve them in public participation only when issues may directly impact their specified group or regions
where they live. The problem here is not the separate recognition of minorities it is but rather that the
language is arguably insufficient in acknowledging that marginalized groups remain a part of the majority.
To truly ensure marginalized people are protected, free from discrimination and able to meaningfully assert
their right to self-determination, their voices also must be deemed relevant to society at large. The language
in The Declaration on Minorities fails to open up sufficient space to allow minorities to share their
worldviews while remaining a pillar of structuring the larger society. In turn this language creates a
qualified right that seems colored more so by exclusion than integration. Nevertheless it must be noted that
the CERD, a more significant and binding document, supports the use of special corrective measures.
Regional instruments have added a context rich dimension that view international law through a historic
and cultural lens. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights26 exemplifies the effort by African
nations to further ingrain international law, specifically the UDHR, into the core of their societies. Though
the African Charter makes no mention of minorities, the African Union, formerly the Organization for
African Unity, has interpreted Article 19 of its Charter to require that states give information on the
“constitutional and statutory framework which seeks to protect the different sections of the national
community.”27 It may be inferred from this directive that protecting disadvantaged groups is an intended
objective of the Charter.
Other regional conventions have gone a step beyond articulating goals and ideologies to suggest specific
measures that may be used to implement international law and regional aims in a practical manner.
Addressing issues of political representation for marginalized groups, the Lund Recommendations on
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Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life28 serve to illustrate a potential device that may
assist regional and national efforts to improve the status of potential marginalized populations.
The main objective of the Lund Recommendations is to encourage effective participation of national
minorities, which is identified as central to maintaining peaceful and democratic societies. The
recommendations strive to facilitate the adoption of state-specific measures aimed at reducing tensions
related to minorities and supporting mechanisms for inclusion.29 This document identifies participation in
decision making, and electoral systems specifically, as means for ensuring that minority voices are
represented at the national level of government. The Lund Recommendations further state that in order to
ensure minority voices are heard, states may make “special arrangements” for special representation. To
this end several different mechanisms, including reserving seats in parliament are specifically articulated.30
With respect to electoral systems, the Lund Recommendations suggest that proportional representation with
lower numerical thresholds and geographic boundaries that facilitate equitable representation may be used
to enhance inclusion of national minorities in governance. It further “encourages testing new and
innovative regimes rather than specifying terms for altering existing arrangements.”31 The details of this
document provide a rich framework for the African Union’s next steps to further encourage representation
for marginalized groups in its member nation states. The Gaborone Declaration on Indigenous People and
Minorities in Africa provides an example of efforts to increase regional policy in this capacity.32
Taken together, the international and regional declarations and treaties discussed above establish the
foundation for the right of all persons to self-determination and participation in all dimensions of society
affecting their lives and communities. These rights serve as a starting point for an inquiry into how
minority rights are in fact manifested. From here one must look past the general principles of international
law to the concrete representation mechanisms that have evolved in part from the basic right of
representation as it pertains to minority groups. Ultimately to breath meaningful life into the spirit of article
25 of the ICCPR, special processes and structures for political representation must necessarily exist.33
While the relationship between self-determination and legislative representation may be set out in
international law, the tools of implementation are outside of the scope and powers of the UN. States are the
subjects of international law and are accordingly charged with the responsibility of complying with that
through the actions of national and local governments. Under international law the duty of the state to take
remedial action in relation to minority groups can be understood as an affirmative duty to ensure that all its
citizens have the ability to inform the decisions which may affect their present or future situations.
Consequently, the aforementioned international principles serve as a pillar for the arguments asserted
below, but are not to be understood as the sole impetus for the creation of mechanisms for special
representation.
The Case for Special Representation
The defining question at this point is whether it is better to encourage political integration of minorities or
introduce special provisions to enhance minority participation.34 Although, history challenges whether
integration alone provides sufficient representation for minority groups, this paper makes no argument
against the validity of using political integration as a means of ensuring representation of marginalized
groups. In fact, if well constructed, mechanisms for special representation will possess qualities of
integration and may ultimately be harnessed towards this end. That said, it is the intent of this inquiry to
limit the scope to an examination of the mechanisms used to provide special representation and their impact
on minority representation.
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Shortcomings in representational democracy bring into question whether certain characteristics need to be
altered to better reflect and meet the needs of society, and especially its associated cleavages. The classic
tyranny of the majority argument posits that traditional representation bodies fail to effectively represent
and protect the needs of minority groups. Because minority interests generally differ from those of the
majority, the majority typically marginalizes groups that do not mirror the mainstream. For example,
politicians “personal ‘ideology’ is a key determinant of observed policy outcomes”,35 if each politician
hails from the same class or religion. Based on this theory, little may distinguish one politician’s views
from another. Similarly, significant differences observed between the policies favored by male and female
legislative representatives also contributes to the value of diversity in the legislature. 36 Simply stated, if a
lack of diversity exists on the legislative level, the opportunity for various marginalized groups to shape
governmental structure and policies becomes insufficient at best.
No universally prescribed democratic mechanism, or precise formula exists to ensure that all voices,
regardless of where they are echoing from are heard. As various international principals demonstrate,
minority protection and the right to self-determination are fundamental concepts upon which inclusive
societies ought to be built. Though notions of representation may be inferred from international
instruments, they are not enough. Even if a strict and well-defined democratic ideal for ensuring the
protection of minorities existed, without culturally sensitive sub-iterations, it would in all likelihood prove
insufficient in any number of local scenarios.
Special procedures are necessary to ensure disenfranchised persons are able to exert their right to selfdetermination through the legislature. Ghai notes that by allowing minorities a voice of their own
establishes the basis of deliberative democracy and also provides an avenue through which these groups
may seek redress.37 Special representation is not intended to place minorities upon a pedestal, but rather, to
place them on equal footing with individuals belonging to the majority. Indeed, these special mechanisms
are premised on their own phase out: once minority representation is successfully attained, the need for
special mechanisms is rendered redundant. The primary goal of special representation is to help
marginalized groups achieve recognizably fair political standing, like that of the majority. It follows that
providing specialized mechanisms to contour the representational equation to the actual mold of society
supports the underlying objectives of representational democracy.
“I cannot see why the feeling and interests which arrange mankind according to
localities, should be the only ones thought worthy of being represented.”38
Marginalized groups and society at large are being harmed due to lack of representation. A society’s
“internal strife is connected to the quality of democracy–– specifically the failure of integrating
minorities.”39 Conflict in many African nations has evolved for want of conflict prevention strategies which
in turn give rise to social tension and violence. In fact, an estimated five million people have died in civil
wars in Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda over the past decade due to the exclusion of marginalized groups.40
There is a widely recognized link between conflicts and violation of minority rights. The African Union has
observed that “peace, justice, stability and democracy call for the protection of the ethnic, cultural,
linguistic and religious identity of all our people including the national minorities and the creation of
35
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conditions conducive to the promotion of this identity.”41 A recent UN report on peace operations asserts
that in many cases of internal conflict, poverty is coupled with ethnic and religious cleavages leaving
minority rights insufficiently respected and the institutions of government insufficiently inclusive. The
report concludes that “every group needs to become convinced that the State belongs to all people”.42
Still many groups are left unconvinced. For example in Kenya alone, Muslim communities complain of
being concentrated in the slums of urban centers, segregated and subject to discrimination.43 Two Ogeik
politicians were killed and 200 belonging to the Ogeik, a hunter gatherer community in western Kenya,
were set ablaze.44 Northern Kenyans have claimed to be marginalized, with MPs having no accountability
to their constituency.45 There are countless examples of similar problems across all of Africa. These cases
bring attention to the urgent need for and implementation of mechanisms for enhancing representation as a
means of promoting conflict prevention and peacekeeping.
Generally, majority leaders who seek to represent the interests of disenfranchised groups promote prejudice
and stereotyping.46 Minority groups see no role for themselves in the centralized government and
consequently a vicious downward spiral of disengagement ensues.47 Under such a system, minorities lack
confidence in existing institutions, doubt their effectiveness and question whether they might lead to further
exclusion. This trend of harm will likely continue unless corrective and preventive measures are
implemented. It is vital to change values and norms of society by widening participation of those groups
who face discrimination.48 By welcoming minority participation, states are typically more stable and
prosperous.49 Conversely, denying minorities rights (presumably that of meaningful representation) breeds
intolerance and authoritarianism.50 Establishing special legislative representation may be viewed as one
means of including historically disadvantaged groups in the public discourse. It also promises an integral
role for disenfranchised groups in the legislature and thereby a potential means of renegotiating
relationships with other groups while moving closer toward the goals of stability and prosperity.
The UNDP has stated that its support of minority participation is not intended as a bias. Rather, it views its
mission as promoting the rights that are owed to marginalized groups that have suffered as a consequence
of discrimination.51 It has been asserted, that democracy is flawed without special protection of minorities,
and that the key component for guaranteeing this protection is ensuring participation in governance.52
Special representation ensures a stake in the country’s political system and helps society focus on the needs
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of historically powerful and disadvantaged groups.53 In addition, the very process of electing
representatives mobilizes minorities and reinforces their corporate character.54 Qualities of protection,
inclusion and progress are inherent to well constructed special representation mechanisms and their value
cannot be understated.
Tools of special representation provide a practical solution where traditional methods for selecting
legislative representational fail to represent the will of all groups equally in a given society. If well
designed and executed, special representation mechanisms are supported by a strong foundation of
international law principals and can be fashioned to suit a nation’s individual history and present needs.
Such mechanisms could provide a venue for marginalized groups to express themselves, be involved in the
decision making process, broaden and contribute to more well rounded discussions and policy creation,
help correct power imbalances, avert violent conflict and societal tensions, eliminate discrimination,
enhance the intellectual makeup of a nation and ultimately create a more democratic and just society. In a
ideal world mechanisms for special representation would be unnecessary. The very notion of
marginalization would be moot and conflict not an issue. But the practical world dictates that special
mechanisms are necessary to ensure stability and equity.
BOX 1: The All Pervasive Impact of Inadequate Representation: A Story of
the Ogoni People
For over 500 years the Ogoni have lived in the Niger Delta of Nigeria as a
fishing and agricultural people. In various forms, the Ogoni have fallen pray to
social, environmental and economic oppression. The most explicit form of
marginalization may be traced back to 1958 when Shell Petroleum Development
Company discovered oil in the Niger Delta. A government decree ordered the
Ogoni to give their lands over to oil development and in 1978 the Land Use
Decree vested all land rights in the government. At no point in these
developments where Ogoni voices included. Since the discovery of oil in the
region, the Ogoni’s environment has suffered and violence has ensued. Gas
flares have caused air pollution and oil spills have been the source of land and
water contamination to name but few of the damaging results linked to oil
exploration, development and mismanagement. To be certain, the subsistence
lifestyle of the Ogoni was also impacted as the crops and fish became spoiled.
The Ogoni began to complain to the government in 1970 and in 1990 they
established the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), an
NGO tasked with advocating environmental, social and economic justice for
their people. In 1994, four of MOSOPs leaders were tried and sentenced to death
and in the 1996 elections MOSOP leaders were prevented from running for
elections. The Obasanjo government is credited as working towards greater
democracy and good governance and in recent years has sponsored development
projects in Ogoniland with the participation of MOSOP.
Despite “civil” rule in Nigeria, protective laws and regulations, public protests,
lawsuits, international support and the highly organized MOSOP, little has
improved for the Ogoni people. Since these forms of public participation have
failed, the pivotal question becomes whether the Ogoni and their environment
would benefit from special representation. A missing component, as found in
2001 by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, was the
genuine integration of Ogoni representation—the actual inclusion and
involvement—into the decisions that impact the wellbeing of this minority
group. Special representation seems a common sense approach that offers to fill
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this void and provide an avenue for the Ogoni to determine the fate of the
environment in which they live.55
The Cons of Special Representation
Notwithstanding the potential for special representation to achieve an equilibrium in societies lacking
effective minority representation, many obstacles may impede its design. Indeed, even if implementing
such mechanisms overcome barriers of creation and find their way into existence, success remains
questionable. Therefore, it is important to raise the persistent critiques to special representation here and
illuminate their implications for the actualizing of such mechanisms.
“Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests
each must maintain, as an agent and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one
nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to
guide, but the general good resulting from the general reason of the whole.” 56
To be certain, special representation is understood by many as being undemocratic. Traditional (or perhaps
more correctly) ideal systems of democracy treat all individuals the same. Void of special privileges,
traditional democracy places all members of society on equal footing. Either through direct representation,
whereby parliament mirrors the nation as a whole57 or representational democracy in which representatives
are selected to represent the voices of society, special representation stands to be in stark contrast with the
principles of democracy. Mechanisms of special representation may adversely affect the quality of
legislative candidates as seats reserved for “special” legislators would be viewed as less competitive and
therefore producing inferior candidates. Similarly, the ability of voters to punish candidates who engage in
wasteful redistribution or corrupt political practices may be reduced. Marginalized groups may advocate
policies more likely to reflect the preferences of minority groups instead of benefiting the whole of society.
Representatives may be more willing to curry favor along group identity lines. Special representation may
also lead to individuals belonging to non-minority groups to disengage from the political process or incite
conspiracy and possibly rebel.58
The concept of special representation is unmistakably linked to minority rights and minority specific issues.
This notion of minorities not only lacks the support of most African nations but is actively shunned.
Cultural diversity in Africa is viewed as a disruptive and potentially volatile force. One central aspect of
many African states’ efforts in nation-building has been to unabashedly renounce ethnicity and promote
national unity. In fact, national unity has been postulated so as to create “a mythical nation-state amidst
multi-ethnic states.”59 During South Africa’s constitutional drafting, Nelson Mandela, spoke out against
cultural, group and minority rights being a central component in the new constitution; asserting that, “any
form of racism was a formula for disaster.”60 The African Union was founded upon the vision that unity of
African nations would "transcend ethnic and national differences."61 In a similar vein, many African
constitutions seek to promote national unity by requiring political parties to advance national objectives and
55
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not be associated with tribes, ethnic groups or religion.62 Arguably, special representation may threaten
cooperation between different groups in Africa’s pluralistic societies. It may also be understood as
undermining the goal of unity and the effort to advance national, rather than group specific, interests by
drawing upon these classifications.
Another potential pitfall of special representation stems from the risk that separate representation and
institutions may to lead to ethnic manipulation or extremism.63 Given the history of violent conflict that has
been politically or ethnically inspired in Africa, awarding particular groups special representation may lead
to additional tension and conflict. As Decalo has observed, “Politicized ethnic sentiment remains the most
meaningful force in Africa’s syncretic, marginal, non-nation states, implying that politics in the new
democracies will constantly reflect this tug-of war with all its deleterious and divisive negative effects.”64 If
this statement is accurate, then another negative attribute of special representation may be that it is
ideologically incompatible with the national identity states are striving to establish. Thus at least in Africa,
special representation could arguably serve to perpetuate cultural, religious, ethnic and other divisions
which most African nations are striving to eradicate. As Stanley de Smith has noted, communal seats tend
“to magnify existing communal differences in as much as communities are stirred to fuller selfconsciousness and electoral campaigns are dominated by appeals to communal prejudices and new
communities discover themselves as further claims to separate representation are lodged.”65
So ingrained is the history of oppression and marginalization in Africa that the claims of historical
disadvantage may indeed be endless. Political elites have historically exploited ethnic and religious
differences for political ends, for example in Nigeria, where historically dominant minorities such as the
Efik or the Ijaw are now marginalized politically.66 Indeed, one might argue that the entire Nigerian
population may be deemed marginalized? Or perhaps geography might be the guiding criteria in
determining what group constitutes a genuine minority. Arguing in favor of district-level as opposed to
provincial-level divisions during the Kenyan constitutional debates, Delegate Ole Osoi declared, “we have
an animal called a province, which is only a more marginalizing factor of the more marginalized. People
like the Ogiek will never go to the province, they will just get finished at the district, just like other small
communities.”67 Delegate Sasura Abdi Tari pointed out that it is:
Proven historically that women at the district level have been marginalized by
the women at the provincial levels and in the city. You will find that in Coast
Province those who are in Mombasa benefit more, in Nairobi Province those
who are in the city benefit more, in Eastern Province those who are in Embu
benefit more, the rural women are always forgotten. So [thirty seats reserved for
women on the basis of provinces in section 106] should go to the district and not
to the province.68
Other characteristics may operate to define marginalization as well. Large groups, clearly not of minority
status, have been marginalized through exclusion from power like the Hutu in Rwanda and the Oromo in
Ethiopia.69 Citizenship requirements have also served to isolate populations. For example, individuals were
denied of citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire. In these
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states, citizenship has been a prerequisite of public participation thereby excluding people from
participating in public life or gain access to land.70 The following section will elaborate on this conundrum.
Where can the line rightly be drawn to fairly distinguish those deserving of special representation? How
can the determining factors be designed to appease even a fraction of society? The potential floodgate
argument poses a particular problem to instituting special representation mechanisms. In addition, pleas for
special attention to group specific issues may be insatiable. For example, in South Africa alone, the Griqua
community sought official recognition of their traditional leaders and protection of their culture; Muslims
wanted recognition of Muslim polygamous marriages and hereditary rights; Khoisan were desirous of help
in developing San languages and teaching them in schools; Khoikhoi sought restitution of their land; the
December One Movement argued for revival of the memories of suffering under slavery; and Indian
communities sought fuller recognition of Hindi and Gujerati languages.71 As may be inferred from these
examples, special representation provisions may likely be accompanied by overwhelmingly numerous and
complex issues that demand fairness in drawing distinctions and establishing remotely effective rules. How
could a systematic approach be effectively designed and executed given the uniqueness of each
circumstance?
“The right to participate is meaningless unless a group has the ability and the resources
to exercise it.”72
Poverty, lack of education and inadequate sanitation are amongst the plethora of issues so many African
nations confront, and each is seemingly more urgent than special representation. As stated in the
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, “the right to participate is meaningless unless a group has
the ability and the resources to exercise it.”73 It is increasingly recognized that minimum levels of education
and other social and economic facilities are necessary prerequisite to effectively exercise the right to
participate.74 The question therefore becomes, given the lack of time and resources, is it prudent to focus a
nation’s efforts on issues of minority legislative representation when other needs, perhaps affecting a more
substantial aggregate of the population, appear to be higher priorities. A slightly different position, though
made along similar lines, is advanced by Professor Cheru. Cheru asserts that a nation must at the very least
address social and economic issues simultaneously with civil and political concerns for solutions to stick.75
Direct correlations have been documented in this regard. In Wilma Rule’s 1970 and 1972 studies, 70% of
the variance in the number of women in legislatures was explained by the number of female college
graduates the number of women in the workforce, the length of women’s suffrage and the level of
unemployment.76 This evidences the importance and influence of other societal factors that may contribute
to the failure or success of special representation. Moreover, these points challenge the potential
effectiveness that a form of special representation may provide.
It could also be argued that special representation is not the best way to ensure or secure the rights of
marginalized people. For instance, mechanisms may be grounded in the executive or judiciary for
addressing problems of the disenfranchised. Given the role of these institutions it may be argued that they
would be more appropriate and powerful avenues through which to launch special representation
mechanisms and achieve more effective results. Furthermore, the particular composition of a given
minority group may raise additional issues, each presenting its own unique obstacles that challenge
society’s level of acceptance and society would have its unique and timely responses to each individual
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group gaining or seeking special representation. To illustrate this complication, if the minority group of
choice is women, in addition to the aforementioned problems, issues of conservative interpretations of
religious texts,77 narrow gender rules, unequal laws, male-biased party leadership, discriminatory
socioeconomic conditions and “women-unfriendly” elections systems would raise additional factors of
potential disenfranchisement that would require further attention beyond a simple special representation
mechanism.78

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

TABLE 1: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SPECIAL REPRESENTATION
Pros
Cons
Enhances representational democracy by
• Special representation is undemocratic, not
contributing to a representational system
treating all people equally
that more accurately mirrors society
• Undermines democratic elections
Majority interests do not typically
• Perpetuates stereotypes and cultural,
represent the interests of minority groups
ethnic, religious and other group
Boosts diversity in the legislature
distinctions
Designed to cater to the needs of different
• Adversely affect the quality of candidates
societies
• Reduces ability of voters to punish
Validates minority concerns and provides
candidates
their representatives with mode of
• Produces policies that are more reflective
expression
of groups with special interests than the
Incorporates marginalized groups and
good of the whole
places them on equal footing with the rest
• Representatives may be more willing to
of society, giving minorities a stake in their
curry favors along group identity lines
nation
• Non-minority groups may become
Means of conflict prevention through open
disengaged and create underground
dialogue and negotiating relationships
movements in rebellion
Builds confidence and a formal means for
• Runs counter to African nationalism
engaging the disenfranchised
• Promotes a form of privilege which may
States that encourage minority
lead to further tension and conflict between
participation are more stable and
groups
prosperous
• Leads to ethnic manipulation or extremism
Provides redress for historical disadvantage
• Claims for special representation may be
Removes obstacles of discrimination,
endless
allowing minorities to become involved ins
• Requires resources to implement which
society
may be better allocated elsewhere
Mobilizes minority group and reinforces
• Not the most effective means to secure the
corporate character
rights of marginalized groups

Who Are the Politically Marginalized: The Semantic Dilemma
As mentioned above, one of the more complex issues of establishing and executing mechanisms for special
legislative representation involves the difficulty in defining what groups are to be given marginalized status
and subsequently special representation. Particularly in light of Africa’s history of ethnically based
conflict, the concept of giving a group any form of privilege over another is indeed problematic. Most
groups are not consciously self aware, and ethnicity has only been an issue where situations of political
polarization exist.79 While marginalization may be seen as a reactionary, dialectical process,80 international
law does not help in clarifying matters. There is no universally accepted definition for
minority/marginalized group/disenfranchised person. That said, the UN Human Rights Committee has
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stated that determining who is a minority or an indigenous person is a “factual question” to be left to states.
However, the Committee has also claimed that such a determination should be based on an objective test.81
While no clear definition exists, a number of criteria have been attributed to minority/marginalized groups
and/or their members. The quality of having a “collective” right that may only be asserted with other
members of the community is an example.82 Victimization is another character associated with
marginalization.83 Historical disadvantage has also been a defining variable. Perhaps most prominently,
Gurr’s indicators have been used for identifying minority groups. His indicators are high birth rates, high
mortality rates, poor health facilities, low literacy and skill levels, lack of resources in comparison to other
groups and marginalization in land ownership84 It has also been asserted that any disempowered group
regardless of its size may be considered marginalized.85
BOX 2: “Minority”86 in Africa?
There is no common legal or practical international standard that is used to distinguish
marginalized groups from the rest of the population. Despite its repeated use across a
range of national and international instruments, no consensus has been reached
establishing a universally acceptable notion of minority. Minority Rights Group
International asserts that regardless of its demographic makeup, a group that is
disempowered may be classified as a minority. To further illustrate complexity in
attempting to clarify marginalization on the African continent, several country facts are
presented here. In Africa's most populous country, Nigeria, over 250 different ethnic
groups have been identified. The following are the most populous and politically
influential: Hausa -Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%,
Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%.87 There are over 24 major African language groups in
Cameroon.88 In Chad, 200 distinct groups exist that are fragmented into territories. In
the north and center of the country: Arabs, Gorane (Toubou, Daza, Kreda), Zaghawa,
Kanembou, Ouaddai, Baguirmi, Hadjerai, Fulbe, Kotoko, Hausa, Boulala, and Maba,
most of whom are Muslim; in the south: Sara (Ngambaye, Mbaye, Goulaye),
Moundang, Moussei, Massa, most of whom are Christian or animist; about 1,000
French citizens also live in Chad.89 In 2003 it was estimated that fighting between the
Congolese Government and Uganda- and Rwanda-backed Congolese rebels which
spawned a regional war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998, left
1.8 million Congolese internally displaced and caused 300,000 Congolese refugees to
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flee to surrounding countries.90 Ethnicity, culture, language, migration, displacement
and geographic demography—these examples illustrate the myriad ways in which a
country’s cleavage populations may be divided and subdivided.
There is no shortage of groups that have entitlement to marginalized status. Economically impoverished
blacks in rural parts of South Africa are neglected by the ANC, the ruling party.91 Violent conflicts in
Angola in 1993 resurfaced due to controversial majoritarian election results that called for a run off
between two ethnically based political parties, Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA and Jonas Savimbi’s
UNITA. Savimbi declined run-off elections and appealed to his group’s fear of being dominated by the
opposing ethnic group,92 creating tensions between the two ethnicities. Political parties in Sudan are
dividing along religious lines—Sudan’s north is Muslim whereas the south is non-Muslim. This divide led
to a collapse of dialogue between north and south and to a renewal of conflict in 1995.93 Once powerfulColonial and minority white-ruled states like Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa
lend negative connotation to the word “minority”,94 though may now lay claim to marginalization.
Marginalized95 groups may be characterized in terms of gender, ethnicity, culture, or religion. Similary,
populations may be isolated according to nomads, indigenous, tribal, non-citizen, immigrant, migrant
worker and displaced person groupings, each of which can be declared worthy of special representation.
Those who are economically impoverished or even in the upper financial echelon of society may also be
disenfranchised. Groups that once ruled and fell from power, homosexuals, youth, the elderly,
educationally underprivileged, physically challenged or the disabled, the list of potential minority groups in
arguably inexhaustible. However, the challenges of identification can be met with unbiased, equitable and
standardized rules and objective and historically sensitive judgment.
Different countries have opted to deal with defining marginalization based on their respective populations.
Reclassifying groups so that their minority description is neutral in character is a method, perhaps
unknowingly, used in Botswana. The Botswanan government considers all residents indigenous and
therefore does not accept a “First People” definition. To avoid problems of ethnic identification, the
government has used the term “Remote Area Dwellers” (RAD) since 1978 to denote people living in rural
areas outside of villages. The government has also created a program called the Remote Area Development
Program to target group based RADs, which are people characterized by: special location (remote areas
outside villages), sociopolitical status (marginalized), and socioeconomic status (impoverished and subject
to discrimination). These RADs are estimated to have a population of 60,000-100,000, of which some
50,000 are San.96
While the Botswana classification system was not established in the legislative context, it provides a
meaningful example of a neutral language that may be used in the legal context. In Uganda, the constitution
enumerates women, disabled, youth and the army as groups having marginalized status.97 Namibia’s
approach identifies marginalized groups as those which are “socially, economically or educationally
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disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws and practices.”98 Despite the efforts to create neutral language,
another complication which arises is that defining one group may lead to the marginalization of another.
For example classifying women as a marginalized group and striving for their equality has been observed
to marginalize peasants.99 The lesson here provides us with concrete models used to frame a group’s
marginalized character in a fashion that mitigates the historical problems of ethnicity and culture while
simultaneously addressing the representational disadvantage.
John Stuart Mill argued for the inclusion of both majority and minority voices in participatory
government.100 He observed that it would be a great loss to society to not include its diverse talents and
views in decision making. For example, a parliament with inadequate female representation might fail to
understand issues significant to women.101 Indeed, a parliament with a higher percentage of women has
been proven to pass more laws advancing “women-friendly policies,” like legislation that benefits children
and families.102 Reynolds states that “the degree to which a system successfully includes women can
indicate a propensity for the system to include other disenfranchised minorities.”103 When applied more
broadly, this pattern may be made applicable to other marginalized groups. To quote Reynolds, “Absence is
not merely a sign of disadvantage and disenfranchisement, but the exclusion of [marginalized groups] from
positions of power also compounds stereotypes and retards the pace of equalization.”104 The unique
experiences and worldviews of minorities promise to enrich the decision making process and provide
incentive for ensuring their inclusion in the legislature.

MECHANISMS FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURE

Proportional Representation
“Electoral systems are not mere details but key causal factors in determining
outcomes…[they do] so directly in that who is elected under one system may not be
elected under another system.”105

Two Common Electoral Systems
The two most common electoral systems used in democratic elections are the first past the post (FPTP) and
the proportional representation (PR) systems. The bulk of case studies and opinions reviewed herein point
to the proportional representation system as the better option for providing a greater opportunity for
marginalized group representation. Electoral systems may be established in a number of ways. Generally,
the electoral system will be constitutionally mandated or established via legislative act. In Africa, there are
also electoral systems informally grounded in tradition. Two preconditions for the proper functioning of a
nation’s legislature include ensuring the right to elect representatives and having an independent electoral
commission or international elections monitors oversee the process and promote trust where autonomous
institutions are lacking.106
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States with constitutional FPTP systems include: Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Uganda. States
with PR systems set out in their respective constitutions include: Angola, Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea,
Namibia and Zimbabwe. Cameroon, Guinea and Seychelles employ a combination of the FPTP and PR
systems.107 Other states have a different combination system in place or different system altogether.
Botswana, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (transitional constitution), Ethiopia, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, South Africa, and Tanzania each employ unique constitutional structures.
Still other African constitutions remain silent with respect to the electoral system. In total, 26 countries
have constitutions that fail to address the electoral system. In these cases, the nature of the electoral systems
is left to legislative and regulatory acts.108
“There is a history of distrusting the electoral process. ‘Rather than provide the
electorate with the opportunity and freedom to choose a government of their choice the
government imposes itself...’109 The electoral system was used to prevent structural and
institutional attempts to challenge the primacy of the ruling party government – a factor
which undermined the democratic condition.”110

The First Past the Post System
The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural [multi-ethnic] society is to adopt
the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post…. Where cleavage is a
problem, one needs a system which will give minorities adequate representation,
discourage parochialism, and force moderation on the political parties.”111
The case for and against FPTP set out below is based principally on arguments advanced by Reynolds. The
FPTP system is considered an advantageous electoral structure as it provides a straightforward choice for
voters. Casting a vote merely requires placing a mark next to a given candidate’s name or reference
symbol. A candidate is not required to affiliate with a political party, and as such, this system
encourages—or at least provides space for—independent candidates. By voting for a specific person, a
voter is able to identify with a human being and not a party. Reynolds identifies the most prized quality of
the FPTP system to be that the elected candidate is in a position to serve and represent constituents from a
specific geographical area and not be restricted by a party’s platform. It therefore also follows that in
voting for a person, a voter may hold the winning candidate accountable for his or her political behavior
and decisions. This outcome stands in sharp distinction to the PR system, where voters cast ballots for a
political party. Another advantage of the FPTP is the ease with which it may be administered. Managing
the voting process and tallying results does not present the same potentially daunting administrative
burdens that are part and parcel of other electoral systems. Furthermore, the outcome of FPTP elections
typically produces a single party government that is not compelled to haggle with minority coalition
partners. Along these lines, FPTP usually excludes extremist parties from holding seats but engenders
more realistic opposition parties. This system generally produces candidates that strive to appeal to various
factions of society and are therefore supported and must answer to a broader spectrum of the electorate
while in office. As may be gleaned from the above, the FPTP system is prized in large part because of its
support for people as candidates, not only political parties.112
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Despite its enumerated advantages, FPTP is not without its shortcomings. The most problematic aspects of
the FPTP are linked to the marginalized group representation and therefore are of utmost concern here.
Inherent to the FPTP is a built-in disincentive for minorities to participate since it is practically a statistical
impossibility for such a candidate to be elected. The FPTP system excludes marginalized groups from fair
representation since the population’s votes are not mirrored by the seats won in the legislature. For
example, in the 1989 election in Botswana, the Botswana National Front won 27% of the overall votes, but
only 9% of the seats. Furthermore, parties endorse candidates that will appeal to the largest percentage of
the electorate, thereby often excluding the participation of potential candidates from marginalized groups.
Reynolds refers to this as the “most broadly acceptable candidate syndrome.”113 This phenomenon factors
into explaining the outcome of a 1995 Inter-Parliamentary Union study which found women were half as
represented in FPTP systems as opposed to PR systems.
First past the post systems have also been found to encourage ethnic parties or parties to run by appealing
solely to a specific ethnicity. The 1994 elections in Malawi evidenced the regional and cultural divide
bred by colonial powers. When the South voted for the United Democratic Front, the Central region voted
for the Malawi Congress Party, and the North for the Alliance for Democracy. Each party secured the votes
of their respective region and culture. However, in Nigeria, the 1982 constitution introduced incentives into
the FPTP system. These incentives were designed to integrate different communities by moderating the
political parties and securing minority support through broader appeal.114
Despite potential incentives, by establishing geographic boundaries as the baseline for determining voter
choice, FPTP defines politics by geography instead of ideology. In effect this buries or wastes the ballots
cast by marginalized voters, thereby excluding the opportunity for their voice to be translated into any
meaningful representation. Wasted votes are understood as contributing to “anti-system” extremist
movements. Coupled with the stagnant nature of the FPTP system and the lack of responsiveness to public
opinion, wasted votes give rise to a lack of faith in the system among marginalized voters. Psychologically,
members of these minority groups may fall prey to the frustration of being disenfranchised and turn
towards more drastic measures to achieve a political voice. Lastly the act of “gerrymandering”, or
malapportionment of district boundaries, may also be noted as a disadvantage of the FPTP system.115
The UN’s 2000 Human Development report points out several additional ways a majoritatrian democracy,
such as one fostered by an FPTP electoral system, impacts and excludes marginalized groups from the
political representation. For example, governments lacking minority representatives and a system of checks
and balances may more easily bypass the rule of law and manipulate or violate the rights of those not
vested. Left unchecked, majoritarian democracies have a history of oppression which has taken the form of
imposing religious practices on marginalized groups or banning languages and other cultural identifies.
Additionally, the economic interests of the majority in power have come at the expense of disenfranchised
groups. Forced relocations from fertile soil or plentiful natural resources have forced some marginalized
peoples into impoverishment.116
The Proportional Representation System
“Fairness and equity in electoral competition does not evolve naturally… fairness and ‘equality
has to be designed introduced and regulated’. An electoral system based on PR is the objective of
one such democratic design.117
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Of the world’s 36 major democracies, 33 use a form of PR.118 In Africa, 13 nations employ a PR system
and an additional number of states combine PR with other systems.119 There are three main forms of PR.
The List PR system is the most common among them. Here, each political party presents voters with a list
of its candidates. The voter selects their party of choice and based on the percentage of votes the party
secures, a proportional number of seats to the legislature is allocated.120 This system may have the entire
state as a single constituency, as with Namibia, or multiple constituencies based on geographical
markers.121 Large constituencies are best for minorities.122 Party slates can be closed, which means that a
party determines which candidates will be allocated a seat after the election. Alternatively, a party under
the open list system allows voters to simultaneously chose a party and indicate their preference for
individual candidates.123 The second form of PR is the mixed member system. It is a PR hybrid that elects
half the legislature from single seat, “winner take all” districts and the other half through the list system.
This system is noted for combining geographic and ideological components with PR.124 This form may also
accomplish the element of proportionality prized in the List PR if the mixed member system compensates
for any “disproportionality” stemming from “majoritarian district results.”125 The final PR system
addressed here is the Single Transferable Vote or Preference Voting system. Here a voter may rank
candidates in order of preference. If a voter’s choice is not elected, then his or her otherwise wasted or
“excess” vote (which is what such a ballot would be in other electoral forms) will be transferred to
subsequent preferences until all seats are filled.126
TABLE 2: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROPORATIONAL REPRESENTATION

Pro
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Con
•

Power sharing/conflict management
mechanism used to overcome ethnic
conflict
party wins parliamentary seats in
proportion to their share of votes
Better at promoting minority group
mobilization and ensuring representation
Minimizes risks of violent conflict
Produces governments that more closely
resemble society
Notably higher voter turnout- due to voter
incentive of selecting a winning candidate
Encourages opposition voices and fosters
better debate
Diversifies candidate and legislators
representatives
Makes geographical gerrymandering more
difficult

•
•
•
•
•
•
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Often results in unstable government
coalitions or political gridlock
Lack of accountability as no person is
directly accountable to constituency
Perpetuates social and political cleavages
Inclusion of marginalized representatives
on party list is merely symbolic and averts
meaningful discussion of minority issues
Party loyalty usually trumps ability of
representative to represent constituency
May encourage population growth through
incentive for minority groups to outgrow
marginalization
Requires additional support mechanisms to
be successful
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Proportional representation emerged as a conflict management and power sharing tool to promote political
stability in disestablished countries. The PR system was designed to “overcome politically important
cleavages in divided societies… it was based on the assumption that political parties are formed along the
lines of these major cleavages.”127 This assumption is well founded when applied to African history as
many nations that have chosen to employ some form of PR have done so to overcome ethnically inspired
conflict. In fact, the PR system has been regarded as an important tool for stabilizing several African
nations. Post-apartheid South Africa used PR in its first all-race election in 1994 and the two leading parties
– the African National Congress and the National Party ran multiracial lists that communicated inclusion to
voters.128 In Liberia, PR was used for one election term as a post conflict tool to redistribute power, after
which the country would revert to an FPTP system. “The rationale underpinning all proportional
representation (PR) systems is to consciously reduce the disparity between a party's share of the national
vote and its share of the parliamentary seats.”129
“Majoritarian attempts to cross-cut political ethnic cleavages into irrelevance only
suppress them and preserves them as latent sources of tension. Proportional mechanisms
prevent such suppression of ethnic cleavages by proliferating, dispersing and expanding
the opportunities of their ventilation.” 130
Proportional representation is based on the principle that any group of like-minded voters should win
legislative seats in proportion to its share of the popular vote.131 In a PR electoral system the percentage of
votes a party receives is translated into an identical percentage of legislative seats,132 provided the
percentage of votes meet the predetermined threshold. In other words, if a party wins 20% of the vote, it
will likewise occupy 20% of the seats in the legislature. The threshold is the minimum amount of votes a
party is de-facto or legally required to obtain in order for the votes to convert into seats.133 For example,
there is a 10% threshold in the Seychelles for 23 available PR seats. In South Africa in 1994, no legal
threshold was in place and the African Christian Democratic Party won two seats out of 400, winning only
0.45% of the national vote. If no threshold exists or it is very low, smaller parties – representing
marginalized group interests, have a greater chance at securing their own seats.134
There is strong evidence that electoral systems based on PR are better at ensuring minority
135
136
representation. It is further argued that PR also minimizes risks of violent conflict.
PR systems tend
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to produce governments that represent the median.137 The PR system is credited with increasing voter
turnout from between 10 to12% twelve percent when comparing nations using PR to similar nations using
winner take all or FPTP systems.138 Voter turnout is understood to be higher because the likelihood of a
voter selecting a winning candidate is increased, therefore providing incentive for voters.139 Ideas are more
likely to be debated and opposition voices heard, as there is increased opportunity for legislatures to
entertain more varied perspective with diversified representatives. Marginalized groups have more
occasions to negotiate for influence because smaller parties could “swing” between various parties political
factions.140 The PR system encourages minorities to mobilize themselves to win access to power.141 It is
interesting to note that majority rule and PR are not mutually exclusive. Richie has explained majority rule
itself is improved by full minority representation: “by maximizing the number of voters who elect
candidates, PR increases the chances that a legislative majority has support from a majority of its voters.”
This translates into the ability to foster a more deliberative legislative process. Additionally, PR makes
geographical gerrymandering more difficult and there is a smaller amount of votes wasted on losing
candidates.142
The proportional representation system is not void of shortcomings. Political stability may be threatened by
failing coalitions or gridlock of parties. Religious or extremist parties may hold a stable government
coalition hostage. Lack of accountability is frequently highlighted as problematic to PR since ideological
parties rather than district representatives are representing the electorate.143 Proportional representation falls
short of incentives for “racial moderation” and bridging the gap between different groups. Instead it
“freezes in and perpetuates the socio-political cleavages”144 by providing the incentive of securing
representation if a group bands together based on their marginalized character. Multi-ethnic candidate lists
are arguably nothing more than eye-candy for marginalized or other ethnic groups, giving the “illusion of
representivity” and “obfuscating a discussion of cultural issues.”145 Gilomee believes the “ideology of
inclusiveness is usually not much more than vaguely reassuring.”146 Closed party lists also pose a problem
as they generally lack measures to ensure that representatives are accountable to their constituencies.147
Party loyalty hinders the ability of a representative to genuinely represent their constituency. Rosa Namisia
, an MP from Nambia, stated that “party loyalties keep women from uniting around the issues of concern to
women of Namibia who are after all the majority of our population.”148 During discussions amongst
delegates at the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission one delegate stated another, perhaps more
curious, argument against PR, that “if going to go by population alone, I think we are endangering the
principle and the policies of family planning. Because we might as well encourage those who are lagging
behind… to multiply faster and catch up and avoid being marginalized.”149 It has been asserted that the
pure PR system alone is only part of the representational puzzle. To be truly effective, PR must be
combined with a quota system for party lists150 or another mechanism designed to secure effective minority
representation.
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Many additional factors contribute to determining the allocation of seats in a PR system. Several examples
are helpful to highlight the range of variables that may contribute to different constructs of the PR system.
Factors that differentiate PR systems include: the method used to calculate and convert votes into seats, the
number of members chosen to represent a district (district magnitudes and the demarcation of boundaries)
and the complexity of the voting process. To better understand the influence and intricacy of these factors,
district magnitudes serves as an illuminating example. Large districts achieve the greatest degree of
proportionality and ensure that small parties are represented in the legislature. However, as districts grow
larger the connection between an elected member and their constituency becomes attenuated as there are
simply more constituents for each member to represent. In societies where local issues are important to the
party’s politics, which is typically the case with marginalized groups, this may have negative
consequences.151
Examples of Proportional Representation in Africa
Proportional representation systems make up a third of all electoral systems in Africa. As addressed above,
a number of states use a pure PR system as mandated by their respective constitutions or legislative
framework, while others combine PR and FPTP systems. Still other states credit their electoral structure to
tradition, or other “informal” origins. Experimentation with PR is not uncommon. Some countries have
opted to implement the PR system for a term to establish a power-sharing framework and then shift to
another electoral system. Many African states have chosen to use the PR system for the aforementioned
reasons and it is widely believed to be a superior system for ensuring legislative representation of
disenfranchised groups. This section spotlights several cases of African electoral systems.
Sudan
In Sudan, PR was chosen in part for its appeal as a transitional mechanism to ease into a power sharing
arrangement and offer a more inclusive system for marginalized groups. Article 67 of the Sudanese
Constitution establishes that 75% of the National Assembly shall be directly elected from geographical
constituencies that reflect the proportional representation of the country’s population. The remaining 25%
of members are elected through special elections or indirect elections from “women, and the scientific and
professional communities, in either states or nationally, as determined by law.” In the event that national
security impedes the process of special elections, the constitution provides that the President of the
Republic may appoint such persons as would normally hold the seats of the constituency until elections
may be held.152 Of Sudan’s 360 members in its National Assembly, 35 or 9.7% are filled by women.153
BOX 3: Why the Increase of Women Represented in Parliament?
Reynolds’1999 study of women in legislatures found that the position of women
in society and history of participation will impact women’s representation in the
legislature. Reynolds found that the number of parliamentary parties and the
existence of a quota for women will increase the number of women represented
in the legislature. Accordingly, legislatures with few strong parties were found
to have more women elected to the legislature while legislatures with many
parties had a lesser amount of elected women, but a higher amount of nominated
women.154 List PR with high district magnitudes and low thresholds are
understood as being most advantageous to women. The ANC party in South
Africa and the Frelimo party in Mozambique operating in a closed list system
placed an admirable percentage of women candidates in top slots so as to secure
a fair number of female legislators. A Mozambican attributed the higher than
average number of female representatives in parliament to women’s
involvement in the national revolution. In a similar manner, women played an
important role in overseeing military activities in Uganda, and this fact is often
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cited as a reason underlying their heightened parliamentary representation in that
country.155
South Africa
The proportional representation system is said to have been introduced in South Africa to allow for smaller
political party representation in parliament. Its nascent Constitution boasts some of the most progressive
provisions in the world, it enumerates no less than 21 categories in its non-discrimination clause.156
Currently, South Africa uses the proportional representation model for electing MPs to its National
Assembly and its upper house, the National Council of Provinces. The country’s PR system maintains a
very low threshold, thereby permitting smaller parties to secure representation.157 Two factors are attributed
to determining voter choices in South Africa: First, ethnic group, as is the case for the predominately Zulu
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The second, the fierce loyalty that many South Africans still hold towards the
ANC. This loyalty is based on the party’s leadership role during the struggle to remove the apartheid
regime from power. In support of the democratic foundation on which PR itself is based, South Africa also
has created a host of institutions and participatory bodies in an effort to ensure that every possible faction
of society is heard by government. A noteworthy policy at the municipal level is that mechanisms
facilitating community participation cater to the special needs of illiterate, disabled, women and other
disadvantaged groups. However, legislators often lack adequate training to effectively relate and explain
government processes to their constituents. As one local has noted, “legislatures are truly just there for
form, and not substance.” 158
“Favorable societal conditions will not substitute for unfavorable electoral systems for
women to reach their optimal representation in parliament and local legislatures. But
unfavorable contextual conditions—including cultural biases and discriminatory
practices can be overcome to a great extent by a[n] alternate electoral system. 159
Despite the noble concept behind the proportional representation system, genuine representation in a PR
system—that would ideally provide for the articulation of dynamic perspectives, vivacious debates and
momentum on issues germane to marginalized peoples—is constrained by issues such as ethnicity, gender,
economic status and demographic identity.160As Suzanne Vos, an IFP MP has stated, women MPs are
“hostage to hierarchical and male-dominated parties where the gender ticket is not the route to party
power.”161 In a similar manner, a female ANC MP has observed that women “are there to represent women
but at the same time one has to be careful because at the next election you could be pushed off the list. You
have to take account of party loyalties.”162
Patterns have also been associated with rural voters whereby this electorate votes according to the party
endorsed by their traditional leader.163 Indeed, traditional leaders possess much power, particularly in the
most impoverished and rural areas. In Eastern Cape, Kwazul-Natal, Limpop and Mpumalanga provinces,
traditional leaders essentially dictate politics. The IFP is associated with traditional leadership and
tribalism. Its constituents tend to be ethnically based. Historically, rural chiefs from Kwazulu-Natal served
as the principal impetus for establishing the IFP. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the IFP, is considered
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among the most forceful politicians advocating traditional leadership.164 It may be gleaned from these cases
that while the PR system offers many ideological benefits, in practice there is room for improving its
operation.
Liberia
The Republic of Liberia, founded by freed slaves from the United States in 1820, declared its independence
in 1847. It was a peaceful nation until 1980 when the leader of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group, Master
Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, seized power by killing President William R. Tolbert and other members of his
government. Shortly thereafter, Doe and his supporters brought ethnicity to the forefront. Those of Krahn
ethnicity took control of the military and government and in 1984 banned political parties. The year 1989
marked the beginning of a seven-year civil war which took the lives of 200,000 and displaced
approximately one million others.165 International institutions attempted to broker over a dozen peace
agreements and nearly 20 cease fire arrangements yet the conflict persisted. The repeated demise of the
peace process and the desperate economic and political situation further intensified internal divisions
between ethnic groups.166 Only the elections of 1997 signaled an end to the civil war.
The proportional representation system was introduced in Liberia to arrange for power sharing between the
competing factions, thereby doing away with the former electoral system.167 Political analysts asserted that
proportional representation could reach constituencies that were made inaccessible during the civil war.168
Charles Taylor’s political party, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) won the 1997 elections by a
75% majority. The NPFL won 70 of the 90 legislative seats.169 Despite the victory many claimed that the
NPFL only won because Liberians feared the outbreak of another war should Taylor have lost.170 While the
Constitution provided for the right to free and fair elections, and a considerable peacekeeping force was in
place during the electoral process, voters remained intimidated by the military forces.171
Still the benefits of PR and its function as a structure supporting political transition are not to be
understated. Granted that the impact of a PR system in a post conflict society is often tempered by
corruption, intolerance and domineering leaders, it is nonetheless a practical solution for renegotiating
power distribution. In this capacity, PR is an important tool for marginalized groups as through it they may
capitalize on representation opportunities. To be sure, meaningful representation, inclusion and dialogue
appear to be a promising formula for conflict prevention. In this way PR offers to aid marginalized groups
and society as a whole by creating institutions in which each citizen has a stake.
Demarcation
A 2003 study analyzed the relationship between ethnic characteristics (specifically race and language) and
a group’s identification with a political party. It concluded that in eight of the 12 countries surveyed,
ethnicity played a “significant” role in determining political party support. In the most ethnically
fractionalized societies, including Nigeria and South Africa the correlation between ethnicity and party
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support was found to be the strongest.172 This finding supports Horowitz’s theory that ethnicity has a direct
impact on electoral behavior in ethnically diverse societies. Horowitz identifies the psychological
connection of citizens to parties as stemming from feelings of loyalty to a particular party and the symbolic
value of a vote selection being equated to group identity.173 Current geographic boundaries in Africa are
intimately linked to the issue of ethnicity and the resulting patterns of ethnically divided constituencies are
not an accidental wonder. Rather this phenomenon is in part a result of careful and intentional planning by
the British, who sought to harness ethnic tensions as a means of maintaining control over their colonies. It
is therefore not surprising that ethno-political affiliations did not rapidly deteriorate.
Constituencies in Africa remain ethnically demarcated. Although the colonial period formally drew
boundaries according to political convention ethnic lines, most of these boundaries remain in effect in the
current post-independence era. The persistence of ethnic boundaries may in part be attributed to the strong
reliance of political parties on ethnically based constituencies. Accordingly, established political parties
typically oppose efforts to reorganize electoral districts for fear of compromising their political support.
Ethnic constituencies represent the mainstay of a reliable voter base that may be encouraged by tribal
leadership and manipulated by political promises of resource allocation and political favor.174 This section
explores the patters in several states to better understand how electoral districts came to be demarcated. It
also pulls upon the example of the San people to understand the effects of delimitation upon a marginalized
group and the different ways of addressing geographic marginalization across borders. It should be noted
that while the history of colonization has left a common mark on many African nations concerning the
issue of boundary demarcation, little reliable information is currently accessible on the current
demographic composition of electoral districts.175
Nigeria
In the 1940s, colonial powers divided Nigeria into three regions, based on the three predominant ethnic
groups in the north, southeast and southwest.176 These boundaries became official in 1954 and remained
until independence in 1960.177 With the establishment of these regions, the interests of minority ethnic
groups became marginalized. Dominant ethnic groups became “regionalist” and minority groups sought
protection from neighboring regions under the wings of the hegemonic groups. The basis for the current
violence in Nigeria is intimately connected to the division of these three groups: the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers
State Movement, the Midwest State Movement and the Niger Delta Congress. In 1963, a fourth region was
created for ethnic minorities in the western part of the country. Five years later, an attempt to secede by the
eastern region inspired the military government to divide Nigeria into 12 states.178 Continuing demands for
greater autonomy increased over time and were met with additional boundary demarcations. Nigeria
jumped from 19 states in1976 to 36 states in 1996. To be certain, this pattern of redistricting facilitated the
increased concentration of power in the federal military government and the mounting tensions between
ethnic groups. As the northern states maintained larger populations, and representation was linked to
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population size, the opportunities for minorities to elect their choice representatives to regional assemblies
became nonexistent.179
In 1993, democrats resurrected a “six-zonal blueprint” designed by the British during their colonial rule.180
Though unofficial, these zones have become increasingly realized and acknowledged as distinct political
entities.181 The southeast, southwest and northwest are home to culturally, linguistically and politically
similar groups while the other three zones are ethnically diverse. The Igbo are the dominant ethnic group in
the southeast while the Yoruba dominate the southwest; both groups have separatist aspirations. In the
northwest, the Hausa-speaking emirates182 are the majority population with a leadership interested in
“transregional aims” grounded in “pre-colonial history and religious culture.”183 The populations in the
northeast and north-central zones share a common history with the Hausa people of the northwest and also
similar goals of living in accordance with Sharia, or Islamic law. These demands have further polarized
ethnic constituencies, particularly between the northern and southern states. The northeast is comprised of
myriad ethnicities, many of which trace their lineage to the emirates or identify with either the traditional
leadership of Sokoto Caliphate or the Muslim-like Kanuri kingdom. The majority of the region is Muslim,
however there is a small non-Muslim population in the southernmost part of the zone that aspires to
autonomy. The north-central zone is the most culturally diverse, boasting the largest number of ethnicities
of all the zones. Though there is no overarching political identity in this area, it is united by the will to
separate from the Muslim emirates. Both it and the southerly zone are “defensive rather than autonomist”.
Like the north-central zone, the southern zone also has various ethnic groups and includes the Niger Delta,
from where 90% of the country’s exports are derived.184
The dynamic of Nigeria’s constituencies and their historical components are too complex to summarize in
this brief space. It has been noted that the problems within Nigeria may not be simply reduced to MuslimChristian tensions, but are much more multifaceted. Though perhaps the inability of repeated successions
of government to adequately tackle minority issues has led to violence, human rights abuses and
environmental degradation, the lack of institutional structure and support for marginalized groups has
further entrenched the colonial legacy of exclusion. Encouragingly, positive steps have recently been
observed. The 2003 election resulted in over 30 political parties fielding candidates, whereas only two were
permitted in 1999. Though more than 100 people were killed in conflicts related to the election, it produced
the first power transfer from one civilian administration to another without military intervention since
independence.185
Kenya
Kenya’s electoral districts or constituencies vary in number of voters from 4,000 to over 300,000. Kenyan
districts are divided into ecological zones. As a result, residents in sparsely populated, arid areas are over
represented while densely populated urban areas are underrepresented.186 This representation system has
existed since the early 1960s and has not been met with the introduction of more equitable electoral
boundary demarcation. Section 42(3) of the Kenyan Constitution leaves the delimitation of electoral
districts largely to the discretion of the Electoral Commission. While this section establishes the standard
that constituencies be equal in number of inhabitants, it gives the Electoral Commission broad authority to
abandon this standard and devise a scheme which it determines suitable in light of articulated criteria in this
section.187 One notable result has been the continuation of a single ethnic group dominating a district.188
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This system was not the subject of much scrutiny until 1992, when Kenya transitioned to a multiparty
political system and political opposition leaders grew wary of the demarcation of existing constituencies.189
Because political parties in Kenya are generally associated with a particular ethnic group or tribe which has
in turn been enveloped into its own constituency, Barkan reasons that the current system better represents
regions that support the ruling party and inadequately represents regions that support opposition parties.190
Barkan suggests that a more equitable design of constituencies would emphasize equal populations per
district and minimize differences in compactness. Given the current electoral districts, the outcome of
parliamentary elections are attributed to “realignment and shifting alliances” between parties rather than to
fair representation.191
Tanzania
During the colonial era, the British ruled Tanzania and imposed a system of local government based on
chiefdoms drawn strictly in relation to ethnic lines. After gaining its independence in 1961, Tanzania
quickly abolished the chiefdom system. From this point the government determined that boundaries would
be demarcated according to population. Despite the shift in approach to delimiting districts, ethnic divisions
did not disappear. As populations in a district would increase, formerly ethnic based constituencies would
be divided into two or more new constituencies, thereby creating additional constituencies though still
largely retaining the same ethnicity. Currently, districts are randomly redrawn. The most recent
demarcation took place in 1995, and these districts remain subdivisions of old constituencies – divided now
by population, but having the same ethnic make up as previous chiefdoms.192
The only Tanzanian districts exhibiting a moderately diverse ethnic makeup exists in the major urban areas.
Approximately 15% of the country’s overall population lives in urban environments, while the other 85%
live in agricultural communities almost entirely characterized by a particular ethnic group.193 At present,
Tanzania is divided into 21 regions and 111 districts.194 A Tanzanian Embassy official in Washington, D.C.
stated that many of the pastoralist tribes have their own representatives who air concerns on behalf of their
constituency.195 The current prime minister and a cabinet minister are from the Barabigs pastoralist group,
an extremely marginalized group, having no representation in parliament. The Maasai are another
marginalized group, and though they have significant representation in parliament it is not considered
particularly meaningful.196 The crux of the representational issues in Tanzania is that the parliament has
never been a locus of power and rests on the margins of the national power structure. Lissu, a Tanzanian
attorney, stated that, “no one takes the parliament seriously.”197 The parliament has no administrative
support, and no representative has assistance in information gathering. As a result, legislators attend
debates unprepared. In the anticipated 2005, election the country will shift to a proportional representation
system, which is hoped to encourage dialogue with opposition voices and offer more credibility to the
parliamentary structure.198 Currently only five of the sixteen political parties are hold seats.199
Niger
In 1991, Niger transitioned to a multi-party system. Legislation provided that the multi-party system was to
be “non-regionalist” in character, though it allowed political parties to carry out “regional or sub-regional
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integration projects that would not undermine national interests.”200 The following year, the government
allocated eight of the 83 National Assembly seats to special electoral constituencies. These special
constituencies were designed to compensate historically disadvantaged minority groups marginalized by
the “colonial recognition of traditional authorities.”201 This law further provided that the eight seats would
go to the smallest minorities, principally the Arab, Toubou and Gourmantche communities, who currently
comprise 1.2% of Niger’s population. 202 In essence, ethnic communities not labeled as “traditional” or
included in the traditional authority scheme for representation were identified by their ethnicity and given a
special seat in parliament.203
In 1993, in an effort to move away from colonial era ethnic districting, Niger embarked on an ambitious
attempt to reform electoral boundaries. Several additional factors influenced the State’s effort at geographic
redistricting. First, public demand for “democratization and liberalization” of political life. Second,
international financial institutions required decentralization. And finally, the 1995 peace accords with the
Tuareg rebels both required the Nigerien government to create “regional territorial collectives” and the
overall disengagement and “systematic mobilization of local stakeholders”. Between 1994 and 1995 Niger
drew new boundaries dividing the country into communes, arrondissements (similar to the municipal
subdivision used in France), departments and regions. Though this redivision established approximately
1,000 entities over four levels, it never made it past the idea stage. Instead, in 1998 boundary reform aimed
to shape Niger into a system resembling decentralization.
The current electoral demarcation in Niger is highly complex. Haphazard divisions are modeled on precolonial historical provinces and have resulted in the creation of regional seats assigned to all provincial
centers and official sultanates. Historical entities such as the Maouri lands and Gobir and Katsina regained
autonomy. The reemergence of these historical districts confused the status of modern towns such as
Dakoro, Filingué and Dosso and reduced their jurisdiction. Consequently, these towns sought to secure
better existing constituencies. As it stands, different regions maintain various levels of political autonomy
and tensions remain linked to ethnic division.
Mauritius
The Dutch settled Mauritius in 1598, and after it passed through the hands of the French, the British
captured the island in 1810.204 Colonization created ethnically based constituencies, though in contrast to
other nations, additional components factored into the “spatial distribution” of groups, thus making
ethnicity but one component in a more complex political identity. Spatial distribution in Mauritius has
been attributed to a myriad of interests including culture, language, religion, labor and occupational
structure. The resulting “ethnopolitical demography”, brought out both inter and intra-group cleavages. The
rise of ethnicity as a main source of marginalization may be traced to the importation of slaves from East
African and indentured labor from India to work on sugar plantations. While the Legislative Council
created a form of limited political representation in 1886 that eventually expanded beyond the FrancoMauritian elite communities to include Creoles, Hindis and Muslims, leadership positions remained
restricted. Mozaffar points out that political mobilization was not only grounded in ethnicity but also
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prompted by trade unions and class-based party politics. Mozaffar adds that the “cultural and demographic
differences corresponded with differences in the distribution of economic and political resources.”205
The 1947 Constitution created a 34-member Legislative Council, 19 members were elected, 12 nominated
and three appointed official members. This composition sought to satisfy the Indo-Mauritian demand for
majority rule and the Franco-Mauritian demand for minority protection. In the 1948 elections, IndoMauritians won all the seats in the three-member rural constituencies and all but one of the representatives
came from the professional middle class. The Creole and Muslims groups received many votes in the urban
constituencies, though due to their geographic dispersion no Muslim was elected. Eventually, most political
parties organized along ethnic lines and by the 1959 elections, parties began forming coalitions in
preparation for the shift in system from five to forty single member constituencies. Notably, communal
interests took priority over class interests for value of strategic coordination. By 1967, political parties
became multiethnic and began appealing to diverse constituencies on the basis of common interest. For
example, the Muslim constituency was too small and spread out so the Comité d’Action Muselman (CAM)
aligned with the Indo-Mauritian Mauritius Labor Party (MLP) while other groups became allies in antiHindu campaigns.
Mauritius achieved independence in 1968.206 Its Mauritian territory is comprised of the island of Mauritius
and the island of Rodrigues. Today, Mauritius is divided into 20 constituencies, each with three seats;
Rodrigues serves as the 21st constituency and has two seats. The National Assembly has 70 members, with
62 elected seats and the remaining eight allocated to the "best losers”.207 The Electoral Supervisory
Commission nominates the eight representatives—or best losers—from among the defeated candidates that
received the most votes in an effort to establish inter-ethnic and inter-party balance in parliament.208
Mauritius is the only African country aside from Botswana that has maintained an uninterrupted democracy
since independence.209
The San People
The San have a population of about 90,000 and live primarily in or near the Kalahari Desert in Namibia and
Botswana. San are also found in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe210 and South Africa211and their archeological
history traces back some 20-30,000 years.212 The San make up 3% of the total populations in both Namibia
and Botswana.213 San people are often characterized as sharing a hunter-gatherer ancestry, and speaking
Khoisan languages, and living in small 25-30 person kinship groups.214 Currently, they are subject to
discrimination and regarded as second class citizens in their home countries.215 According to Suzman, San
have been targeted by special statutes and in every country they have lived in they are treated as
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vagrants.216 Hitchcock observes that the development of Community Based Natural Resource Management
(CBNRM) is a promising development for the San as it allows them to exert control over their lands and
resources.217 Since 1997, 28 CBNRM schemes have been created in Botswana and 14 in Namibia. In
addition, many San are working in the Workgroup for Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa,218 an
organization created by San people to represent them at all levels of society.219
The San in Botswana
Currently, there are three San representatives in the district council of Ghanzi, Botswana, where 42% of the
population are San. There is one female representative in the House of Chiefs from the Chobe district,
though she is not believed to be voting on behalf of San interests.220 Hitchcock argues that the San of
Botswana are involved in a great struggle. As marginalized groups the San are “co-opted and become little
republics,” though they are actively trying to become more engaged in the political process, particularly in
Botswana, where efforts are made to secure a special representative in parliament.221 This undertaking is
hampered by the fact that the government of Botswana does not recognize the San as a distinct people.
Representation of the San is partly accomplished through the dominant Tswana tribal system. As
mentioned above, Botswana identifies all residents as indigenous people. Instead of identifying ethnic
groups for special assistance, the government created the Remote Areas Development Program to provide
aid to a less controversial “designed” group. This necessarily impedes the creation of special representation
and consequently, any chance for the promulgation of San rights and views in parliament. Unfortunately,
San representatives who have become district counselors typically fail to advance the interests of their
constituency or effectively represent San people, as they have been noted to merely represent their own self
interests.222
The San in Angola and South Africa
Discussing constituencies as they relate to the San is challenging, insofar as they live in small scattered
groups and have historically been dominated by other ethnicities. In Angola for example, San communities
live on communal lands managed the Bantu sobas223 and local government. In these areas, San have no
jurisdiction over their lands nor any control over their resources. San leaders are precluded from
representing themselves at local soba council meetings. In 2003, Senhor Piriquito Kambili of Hombo,
Kipungu Municipio, Huila Province and Senhor Arudingo of Cafima, Kwanyama Municipio, Cunene
Province, two San leaders were recognized as leaders by the local government and soba councils and
currently act as representatives, or perhaps more correctly liaisons, between government agencies and the
San people.224 In northwest and northwest South Africa, land bases have been allocated to the ++Khomani,
!Xun and Khwe, three small San communities, for further development. It is unclear how these
constituencies are represented.225
The San of Namibia
Namibian constituencies were created on the principle of separate development.226 The South West African
Administration (SWAA) allocated prime farming land in central Namibia to white farmers and marginal
areas or “native reserves” to the Herero and Nama peoples. The San people were not even considered for
these plots, as they were deemed an insufficiently developed group. This process was implemented by the
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Native Reserves Commission of 1921 who carried out the SWAPO development scheme, allocating
separate reserves for various ethnicities and controlled their movement within the colony. The Odendall
Plan formally enshrined this practice during the 1960s and 70s.227 Until today, Nambian townships remain
divided into separate “homelands” based on ethnic groups such as the Herero, Damara, Owambo and
others.228
The dominant party is the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), traditionally supported by
the largest ethnic group in the country, the Owambo, who comprise approximately 50% of society.229 The
rest of Namibia consists of more than seven minority groups none of which make up more than 10% of the
general population.230 SWAPO has been known to address minority concerns, and as a result has harnessed
the support of many members of minority constituencies.231 SWAPO’s policies culminated in the
Proclamation AG8 of 1980, which empowered seven major ethnic groups—the Basters, Damara/Nama,
Herero, Himba, Kavango and Owambo—to elect government representatives from their respective ethnic
constituencies.232 This policy effectively excluded other more marginalized groups.
Several political decisions made with respect to the San people in Namibia underscore the need for San
interests to be made an equal and integrated part of the decision making process. The 2001 Traditional
Authorities Act (TAA) establishes a role for traditional leaders within the overall state governance scheme.
The traditional communities enumerated in the TAA are afforded recognition and a voice although
parliamentary influence remains unequal.233 To be considered a “traditional community” the TAA requires
that an ethnic group must “inhabit a common communal area.” Because Namibia never granted the San
land rights in the native reserves, according to the TAA they are deemed a landless people and therefore
denied the opportunity to secure representation by their traditional leaders.234 In 2002, none of the
traditional authorities from the traditional San communities were listed as such. However, more recently
example, three of the six San groups in Namibia were recognized by the Namibian government as
traditional communities. The !Kung of the Tsumkwe District West, the Ju|’hoan of the Tsumkwe District
East (Nyae Nyae) and the Naro of the Ghanzi District are the recognized communities though
representation in the parliament still does not exist. In 2001, the Namibian government denied the Khwe of
West Caprivi and the !Xõó of Omaheke South and the Ju|’hoan of Omaheke North official recognition.235
Needless to say, without the requisite recognition and inclusion in existing mechanisms of governance, the
San remain inadequately represented in Namibia. While one member of the National Assembly is San, no
regional or local council seat is occupied by a San person.236 Subsequently, the San do not benefit from
laws like the Communal Lands Bill which grants community leaders the right to allocate land and
“reaffirms land as a constituent of their heritage and identity.”237 In light of these realities, on the ground it
would appear that article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, that declares “delineation of
the boundaries of the regions and Local Authorities… shall be geographical only…”238 is arguable.
Guaranteed Minority Seats: Quotas and Reserved Seats
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“The argument that special representation is reserved for groups (of a special kind)
carries with it the proverbial Pandora’s box.”239
Another method for securing special representation for marginalized groups in parliament is to guarantee
them a minimal number of seats in the legislature. Essentially, this practice equates to affirmative action or
positive discrimination. Parliamentary seats may be set aside for enumerated groups using several different
mechanisms. Two of the more common mechanisms are reserved seating and quotas. At least 17 countries
in Africa use a form of the quota system240 and a minimum of five countries reserve seats.241
Geographical quotas are common to nearly all political systems in Africa.242 They are employed to ensure
that densely populated areas will have a predetermined minimum number of representatives, though no
uniform international application exists, when used in the parliamentary context, a quota is understood as a
mechanism specifying a certain number or percentage of members of a body, either in a candidate list or a
parliamentary assembly. Essentially, a quota functions as “a qualitative jump into a policy of exact goals
and means.”243 The quota system shifts the burden from individuals belonging to marginalized group to
those who control the legal instrument, government, or committee charged with developing or preserving
the electoral process. The core idea behind this system is to recruit marginalized peoples into political
positions and to ensure that they are not isolated in political life.244 Quota systems aim to create a “critical
minority” and strive to establish form of a balance at the national level of government. Quotas may be
applied to a pool of potential candidates, nominated candidates or elected candidates. 245 Ideally, the use of
a quota serves as a stopgap measure to be removed once the obstacles impeding fair representation is
remedied. It should be noted that the use of quotas are gaining international support.246
“The use of quotas is increasingly influenced by international recommendations and
from cross-country inspiration. However there is no international concept of quotas as
they are met with very different contexts in individual countries.”247
The effectiveness of a quota system is contingent on many variables including the country context, method
by which the quota is established and terms of implementation. There are three principal types of quota
systems: Constitutional Quotas, Election Law Quotas or Regulation for National Parliament and Political
Party Quotas for Electoral Candidates. Constitutional Quotas essentially enshrine the quota provisions
within framework of the constitution. This practice is currently used in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Electoral
Law Quotas or Regulation for National Parliament encode the quota provision either in national legislation
or a regulatory framework, as is the case in Sudan.248 Finally, the National Parliament and Political Party
Quotas represents an internal structure which takes one of two forms. The given political party may be
mandated to nominate a prescribed number of candidates249 from a given denomination, or the party may
establishe a fixed percentage of candidates from certain denominations250 by its own will and design. The
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African National Congress in South Africa and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in Mozambique
use the Political Party Quota.251
The 1980s and 1990s saw the women’s movement galvanize itself around securing positions of political
influence in decision making. In 1995, The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing called for a
30% floor of women representatives in national governments. Of the elections held in 23 sub-Saharan
Africa countries from 2000-2002, 14 of them recognized an increase in women parliamentarians.252
Notably, Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania and Uganda have made
major political strides in this regard.253 That said, during the same election cycle four African countries,
including Zimbabwe, witnessed a decline in the proportion of female representatives. Thirty countries
worldwide implement a form of gender quota. Beatrice Kiraso, a female Ugandan MP, has stated that
quotas “kick start the process” of increasing women’s participation in national politics.254 However, as
Mata Sy Diallo, a former female vice-president of the Senegalese National Assembly, has observed, “it is
not a cure for the makings of a true democracy.”255 Many have pointed out that a transitory quality should
be included in the fashioning of a quota system.
The use of reserved seats first emerged in the 1930s and 1940s in Britain. The British used this system to
allocate seats in its governing councils to Hindus and Muslims, and eventually to European planters and expatriots.256 Previous notions of having reserved seats for one or few women, representing the vague and allembracing category of "women", are no longer considered sufficient.257 Moreover, the distinction between
the quota system and reserved seating arrangements is increasingly blurred. One definition provides that
reserved seats set aside a certain percentage of seats for individuals representing a defined group rather than
setting aside candidate positions. 258 In any case it appears that albeit two, artificial distinctions may be
discerned. Reserved seats are seen as less progressive, typically allocating a less significant, though perhaps
no less meaningful, number of seats to a designated group.259 The second distinction is that reservations
generally are associated with ethnic or cultural cleavages, while quotas are associated with women.260 This
distinction does is not hold true across the board. For example, Uganda reserves one seat from each of its
39 districts for women, Tanzania reserves 63 out of 295, and Eritrea reserves 33 of 150 seats.261 Burkina
Faso262and Rwanda apply similar provisions. 263 Uganda also reserves seats in parliament for youth, the
disabled, salaried workers and the army.264 Ethiopia, Mauritius and Niger each reserve seats for national
ethnic minorities.265 Given this negotiable distinction in terminology, these two mechanisms will be treated
251
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the same for purposes of this analysis. This mechanism will be broadly characterized here as a de facto or
legal or mechanism guaranteeing a minimum number of parliamentary seats to a marginalized group.
TABLE 3: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GUARANTEED PARLIAMENTARY SEATS
Pro
Con
• Compensates for barriers that
• Lends preference to one group over another,
prevent equitable representation
violating the principle of equality
• No discrimination
• undemocratic, as voter is unable to decide who
will be elected
• More than one delegate for a given
marginalized group removes
• Exclude qualified candidates because they do not
pressure from a single token
fit the appropriate gender role
representative
• People do not want to be elected because of their
• Need for diverse perspectives
affiliation with a specific group
• Elections are more about
• Create internal party tensions and ill feelings
representation and not educational
toward those who are included based on quota266
qualification
•
“Would you then say that 10 percent of the
cricket team should be white and the rest black
• Qualifications attributable to unique
because that is the make up of the nation? You
experiences of disenfranchised
would not, because everyone wants to play
groups are viewed as less significant
cricket.” Chief Whip Douglas Gibson of the
in majoritarian system
Democratic Alliance in South Africa.267
• Political parties mainly control
• Gender quotas may be mistaken for a “glass
nominations, not voters
ceiling”268 or unacknowledged discriminatory
• Conflicts surrounding quota system
barrier that prevents women and minorities from
subside over time
rising to positions of power or responsibility269
• Quotas are temporary and removed
after historical disadvantages are
remedied
Guaranteed Parliamentary Seats: Country Examples
South Africa
At the end of apartheid in South Africa, the African National Congress, the nation’s largest and most
influential political party, adopted a quota for women to increase their representation within the party.270
Section 60 of South Africa’s Constitution requires that each province’s delegation to Parliament include
three special delegates whose selection is defined by national legislation, and “must ensure the participation
of minority parties in both permanent and special delegates.”271 While the constitution specifies that
national legislation must be established to address the issue of minority quotas, tailored national legislation
does not appear to yet have been created. A more formalized quota system is also applied in South Africa’s
municipal elections.
Malawi
The Constitution of Malawi, Chapter 6, section 62 (1) states that the National Assembly will represent
every constituency in Malawi and that the Electoral Commission shall determine the formula for
calculating the number of seats for each constituency. The Constitution provides for greater specificity
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regarding the composition of the Senate. The Senate is to consist of 80 members, one elected Senator and
Chief from every District and 32 additional senators determined by the Senate who will elect and nominate
the remaining 32 senators from each group enumerated in section 68 (1)(c). Specifically, interest groups,
societal groups and religious groups are identified as being worthy of representation in the Senate. More
specifically, they are to hail from groups including women’s organizations, the disabled, farming and
business sectors, trade unions, persons recognized as being “outstanding” contributors to society in the area
of social, cultural or technological development of the nation, and every major religious faith in the
country. The procedure for filling these seats is as follows: A Nominations Committee, is established
within 45 days of each local government election. This Committee consists of the Speaker of the National
Assembly, the Ombudsman and seven elected Senators appointed to the Nominations Committee on a
motion by the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Nominations Committee is charged with ensuring,
whilst it considers nominations for the aforementioned 32 Senate seats, that the Senate proportionally
represent the different factions of the Malawian society, including an equitable gender balance.272
Kenya
Kenya is currently undergoing an expansive constitutional review process. The issue of how to best
represent marginalized peoples is a topic of much debate, yet no clear consensus has emerged on this issue
to date. As it stood in 2002, The Kenyan Constitution designated 12 reserved seats in the National
Assembly to be filled by representatives of ‘special interests’, such as minorities or professions. These
representatives were to be appointed by the elected members of the National Assembly.273 A 1997
constitutional amendment provided that nominations would be weighed proportionally to each party’s
elected seats in the National Assembly.274 In making their nominations, parties had to observe the principle
of gender equality.
The nomination process was often justified based on ensuring minority representation or securing the
participation of individuals with special skills or experiences who were otherwise unwilling to compete in
elections. However, Ghai has concluded that little evidence points to the mechanism being used to this end.
Candidates defeated in elections or otherwise active in politics have been appointed to the National
Assembly through the nomination procedure.275 Over time, use of the nomination mechanism as a backdoor
for failed candidates caused the system to become delegitimate.
Though this mechanism lost credit with the Kenyan population, during discussions for the creation of the
new Kenyan Constitution delegates advanced arguments in support of special representation as a means of
ensuring representation for marginalized groups. Hon. Delegate Charles Lwanga, advocating on behalf of
affirmative action, spoke about the Ogiek people who have a population of 5000-10,000 people, and lack
effective representation. He stated that if a party list were drawn, the Ogiek would be left without
representation. In Lwanga’s eyes, this was reason enough to ensure that a number of seats should be set
aside for minorities.276 Hon. Delegate David M Gitari supported the portion of the draft constitution
involving the representation of women and a more broadly construed concept of marginalized people. He
argues that a third of the parliamentary seats should be allocated to women.277 The previous Kenyan
parliament had six or seven women and currently there are 17 female representatives.278 “If we leave them
to compete with men, I think history has shown that they will still be marginalized in one way or another.
Marginalization is not merely for pastoralists, slums in the city of Nairobi hold marginalized people
without clean water or decent sanitation.”279
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Moving beyond consideration of these protective mechanisms, some delegates articulated practical
measures designed to ensure more equitable representation. Hon. Delegate Luseno Liyai suggested that in
the interest of affirmative action, 5% of the seats in the National Assembly, Devolved Governments280 and
8.5% in the Senate, should be reserved for special interest groups, including persons with disabilities, the
youth, labor organizations and other minorities and at least one third of the seats should be held by the
marginalized gender.281 Liyau also spoke of extending the principle of maintaining at least one third
affirmative action seats for the marginalized gender to the Senate and the Devolved Governments and
ensuring that at no time would one gender be permitted to have more than a two thirds of majority.282 The
concept of two thirds representation as a ceiling did not fair well and was subject to much criticism. The
Review Committee concluded that reservation of seats for women and special interest groups was a
superior system and that the previously discussed mixed member proportional representation system would
be dropped.283
New language was recently introduced to amend the 2004 draft constitution. The proposed amendment to
article 83 (1)(b) states that “not less than two and not more than ten other members, at least one-third of
whom shall be from the marginalized gender and one tenth from persons with disabilities.”284 The outcome
of these deliberations remains uncertain and a final new constitution for Kenya has not yet been
accomplished. Given the limited nature of this assignment, arguments against having a form of special
representation being integrated into the Kenyan constitution are not been discussed here. Suffice it to say
that most participants favored the idea of guaranteeing seats for specified marginalized groups and that the
focus rested on the best way to achieve this goal rather than debating the merits of its inclusion.
BOX 4: Inadequate Representation of Women in Kenya: Problems & Solutions
From independence until 2001, 10 women in Kenya were elected to the National
Assembly and only eight served as nominated members.285 Currently 16 women hold
seats in the National Assembly.286 Several problems were identified by Ghai as giving
rise to the difficulty in increasing representation of women in the Kenyan Parliament. The
first obstacle is traditional prejudice against women. Ghai argues that by enabling
participation of women through constitutional provisions, the constitution itself can
reduce prejudice. The second barrier is that political parties are reluctant to nominate
female candidates. Mandating parties to nominate a prescribed number or proportion of
female candidates or adopting an electoral system where parties have incentive to adopt
this practice can help to overcome this obstacle. The last representational hurdle is that
voters are reluctant to elect women. To this, Ghai responds by embracing the PR electoral
system. Proportional representation systems are believed to be more effective than
majoritarian systems for electing female candidates – and the larger the constituency the
better. It has also been observed that urban constituencies return more female
representatives than rural ones.287
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Article 54(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia states that “Provisions
shall be made by law for special representation of minority Nationalities and Peoples.” Section 3 further
provides that there shall be no more than 550 Members of the House and that such members shall be based
on population size and special representation of minorities. The constitution creates seats for a minimum of
20 people representing minority “Nationalities and Peoples”, however the details of this system have yet to
be clarified or entrenched in law. Part II Article 61(2) of the Constitution, referring to the makeup of the
members of the House of the Federation, states “Each National, Nationality, and People shall be
represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be
represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population.”288
Ethiopia’s lower house, the Yefedereshn Mekir Bet or Council of the Federation, currently has 117
members, one delegate from 22 minority nationalities and one from each professional sector of the
remaining nationalities designated by regional councils which may elect them directly or provide their
direct elections.289
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso, like most African nations is wrought with a history of patriarchy and socio-cultural traditions
condemning women to subservient and submissive roles. Evading such stereotypes has placed an undue,
though inescapable, burden on female representation in Burkina Faso, as the stereotypes themselves
effectively obstruct the emerging female political voice. Burkina Faso became independent in 1960. The
following two decades saw four different constitutions and rule by military juntas. Although the principle
of gender equality was present in the country’s framework, it only achieved constitutional status under
Article 12 of the 1991 Constitution. Female representation has steadily risen in Burkina Faso. The first
woman was elected to the legislature in 1977 and in 2002 eleven women accounted for nearly 10% of the
legislative seats.290 This increase is in part attributed to the revolution of 1983 which expanded the reach of
democracy in the country, and aspired to integrate women into all levels of the decision making process. In
1992, the national legislature designated that the Assembly’s deputy-speaker or vice-president should be
held by a woman (1999-2000 proved an exception).291 Currently a national legislative quota exists to
reserve seats for female representatives.292 In 2002, the Parliament was modified from a bicameral to
unicameral system with the National Assembly being designated the single legislative body.
Several challenges further impede the ability for women to succeed in political life of Burkina Faso. The
country employs a proportional representation list electoral system. However, women are placed at the
bottom of the list, giving them little opportunity for being elected. Moreover, these slots are open only after
a woman overcomes the barrier of actually being placed on a party list. As Tiendrebeogo-Kaboret notes,
because it is tradition for a woman, upon marriage, to move to the husband’s village, women effectively
become outsiders, robbed of their connections to a home village that may have increased the likelihood of
being nominated as a candidate on a party list. Education and economic disadvantages also contribute to the
political hurdles women face. The literacy rate is approximately 15% and a mere 34% of girls have access
to schooling. Moreover, literacy and personal autonomy are unwritten qualifications for holding public
office, and are used to exclude women from parliament.293
Rwanda
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Rwanda’s lower house boats 49% female representatives, the highest percentage of any country in the
world. The Constitution designates 24 of 80 seats as reserved for women. After the 2003 election (the first
after the genocide), 39 of the 80 seats were held by women. Rwandan women lobbied, assisted in drafting
the constitution and developed voting guidelines to ensure seats for women.294 These factors aided
Rwandan women in securing parliamentary seats through the country’s seat reservation system. While
women in Rwanda have improved their political position, pleas for special representation echoed by other
marginalized groups such as the Batwa, a hunter-gatherer group making up the smallest ethnic population
(approximately 20,000) in Rwanda, have been less successful.295 There is a void of available information
on Batwa status. Though there appears to be no public policy response to the Batwa request for better
representation, it should be noted that the Rwandan constitution forbids “any word or act deemed to
296
promote ethnicity.”
BOX 5: Outside of Africa: India’s Mechanisms for Castes and Tribes
Increased political representation for disadvantaged minorities in India has been shown to
allow them greater influence on policy-making. In India, before every state election,
specified jurisdictions are declared reserved for disadvantaged castes and tribes. Not less
than 25% of all legislators in India at both state and national level come from reserved
jurisdictions. Only members of a group designated to benefit from the reservation system
can stand for election and the entire electorate votes over the same set of candidates. The
effect of this system is altering legislator identity and increasing political representation
afforded to minority groups in the legislature without diminishing voter identity. Article
332 of 1950 Indian Constitution requires that state-level political reservation reflect the
scheduled castes (16% population) and scheduled tribes (8% population) population in
every state. These numbers can only be revised after new census estimates is provided.
Two independent national-level commissions are responsible for implementing this
mandate (Election Commission and the Delimitation Commission). However, while
scheduled castes have emerged as an important political block in post-independence
India, scheduled tribes remain politically marginalized.297 Pande’s main finding is that
resources have been redistributed in favor of groups which benefit from political
reservation, evidence that reservations can enhance group’s policy influence particularly
on targeted redistribution.298
Mauritius
Mauritius is one of the two oldest and most successful democracies in Africa. In Mauritius, four of the 66
seats in the National Assembly are reserved for the losing political parties to represent various
constitutionally recognized ethnic minorities. These seats are appointed by the election commission. These
minorities are Hindus, 52% of the overall population; Muslims, 16.6%; Chinese, less than 3%, and FrancoMauritian/Creole Christians some 2.9%.299 (See also discussion on constituencies in Mauritius).
Niger
The National Assembly in Niger has 83 members, eight of whom are members elected in single-seat
national minority constituencies.300 Prior to multiparty elections in the 1990s, the National Movement for a
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Society in Development party set aside five seats for women through the quota system adopted by the
party.301 (see also discussion on constituencies in Niger)
Tanzania
The Tanzanian Constitution provides for special representation of women in Article 66(1)(b), of
guaranteeing five seats in the House of Zanzibar 66(1)(c) and also 10 representatives to be appointed by the
President to the National Assembly 66(1)(d). Article 78 (1) states that political parties are required to
submit names of women to the Electoral Commission on the basis of proportional representation among the
parties that secured seats in the National Assembly. With respect to women MPs, part 66(1)(b) provides
that the percentage of women in parliament shall have a quota of at least 20% and increase “progressively”
thereafter.302 There are multiple issues for which the electorate has expressed including the proposal to
increase the number of presidential appointments. Female MPs are widely regarded as “token” members
who take positions on issues based one what will secure their place on the party list. Complaints have also
been lodged regarding the passive role female MPs.303
In Depth Look at Uganda
Britain colonized Uganda in 1894 and ruled until the country’s independence in 1962. After a number of
coups, Idi Amin asserted control of the country. Amin’s rule spawned a violent wave of ethnic intolerance,
including the banishment of 60,000 Asians. In 1980, this streak of abusiveness, continued under Obote’s
rule, this time targeting Rwandan refugees. Ethnic tensions intensified and another coup ended Obote’s
second regime in 1985. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) ruled Uganda through its platform of
popular participation grounded in a “no party system of governance” that sought to eliminate pluralism.
Although the NRM supported marginalized group rights, this concept was restricted to Asians and women.
The NRM’s rule is not immune to opposition or violence. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is one
principal opponent, and its roots may be traced to Christianity and traditional religions and the Allied
Democratic Front (ADF), which is comprised of Salaf Muslims and former Ugandan soldiers. Though it is
understood that each government has accepted ethnic diversity, it is also clear that each ruling party has
sought to promote its own ethnic group by oppressing other ethnic groups. 304
“Individual merit” has been considered the prerequisite for individuals to participate in Ugandan party
politics. This dogma was in part aimed at drowning out ethnicity, religion and party politics as relevant
issues that the NRM deemed as harms that create social divisions. Consequently the NRM banned
independent political activities, thereby placing a stranglehold on rights of free speech, assembly and
expression guaranteed by Uganda’s constitution. One Muslim Ugandan observed that when a member of a
minority group tries to politically organize, they are deemed as opposition and therefore a “potential
enemy” to the NRM.305 A major problem noted by Baker is that NRM policy recognizes two narrowly
defined minorities. The first group is those individuals central to the NRM struggle and the second consists
of “historical minorities” including “women and the disabled.” This definition significantly restricts the
scope of Article 32 of the Ugandan Constitution (discussed below). These two groups have been given
special legislative representation and subsequently they have gained greater economic and social power as
compared to other marginalized peoples. Generally, minority groups are assumed to be represented by their
county MP, however, this assumption is incorrect. For example, Asians and the Muslim Tabligh sect in
Uganda have taken initiative to alter their historically disadvantaged standing, yet due to the restrictions
placed on political power, these efforts have been of limited consequence.306
Article 78 (1) of the Ugandan Constitution provides that in addition to parliamentary members being
directly elected by constituencies, the Parliament shall also consist of one woman for every district and
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include representatives of the army, youth workers and persons with disabilities. Parliament has the option
to add additional groups to this list, however this option has yet to be exercised. Article 73(2) goes on to
establish a review clause for the special representation provision and the option to continue, increase or
eliminate such representation for these groups. Initial review of the special representative provisions are to
be accomplished in the tenth year after the establishment of the Constitution and every five years
thereafter.307 The Constitution further provides for facilitating registration and voting for persons with
disabilities.308 People with disabilities have representatives in Parliament from each of the four regions of
Uganda. Women and youth also have special representation in Parliament. These representatives are
elected through legally constituted Electoral Colleges.309 In addition to gender, youth and disability, the
Constitution under Article 32 provides that the government may also adopt affirmative action policies to
compensate historical wrongs or imbalances impending any marginalized group. This article also
establishes the Equal Opportunities Commission to carry out the mandate of Article 32.310
Representation of marginalized groups in Uganda is not reflective of group needs or claims, nor does it
effectively include members of marginalized groups in the legislative system.311 For example, the Batwa
Pigmies, a landless group of about 3,000, are represented by individuals outside their group. In 2001, there
were several Batwa representatives at the local level, though those individuals were among the more
assimilated and not known to be advancing Batawa interests. Most Ugandans are unfamiliar with Batwa
issues and stereotype them as being violent and secretive. Although the Tabligh Muslims in comparison to
the Batwa they are an organized group with a louder more articulate voice, they consider themselves to be
poorly represented and discriminated against.312 Baker observes that Uganda’s current system does not
permit marginalized groups to express themselves through organized political parties since minorities
cannot organize political parties. Uganda has some 56 ethnic groups classified by linguistic similarities
scattered throughout the country. More than three quarters of Uganda’s population live in rural areas. While
Article 36 of the 1995 Constitution guarantees minorities the right to participate in decision making and to
have their views taken into account in the making of national plans and programs, this provision is
continually disregarded.313
The arguments promulgated both in favor of and against special representation during the Uganda
Constitutional Commission of May of 1993 illuminates some of the challenges in opting for special
representation. Two central arguments opposing special representation reasoned that special interest groups
would “debase” the core principle of democratic representation and that individuals belonging to special
interest groups would be granted disproportionate representation as compared to the average person.
Additionally, and perhaps articulating the most complex aspect of special representation, critics questioned
where the line would be drawn?314 This issue raises itself repeatedly throughout the course of any special
representation discussion, as the groups seeking such representation may indeed be endless and the
objections to including a particular group may create additional political and social tensions.
The military is one group advanced as a special interest group which continues to attract a great deal of
controversy. Some Ugandans argued that for the 1995 Constitution to be effective, it was vital that the army
be vested and committed to its success. These individuals understood the army to be a key force in securing
the stability of the country in 1993, when constitutional Commission discussions transpired. They argued
that for the Army to work as a partner with civilian authorities, rather than threaten stability it needed to be
part of the decision-making process.315 In light of its role in Uganda’s turbulent history, granting special
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representation to the army was understandably accompanied by much opposition. During the
Commission’s discussions, opponents questioned the army’s supposed neutral and apolitical position, and
also expressed fear over any involvement in the legislative decision making body.
The Uganda Constitutional Commission raised two points in favor of special representation. The first
claimed that the establishment of special representation would guarantee different factions of society would
support the new Constitution. Second, special representation could be used to correct the history of
marginalization and exclusion of women, youth and workers from political and social life.316 In 1993, over
50% of Uganda’s population were women and over 60% were youth. The “talent and wisdom” of these
members of society was clearly lacking on the parliamentary level. The idea of using a special mechanism
to represent these groups in the parliament was identified as but one means of addressing the problem of
marginalization. However, it was also noted that such representation was not intended to be a permanent
fixture of the legislative system. Rather, once the “fruits of special representation” broke down obstacles
impeding disenfranchised groups,317 such mechanisms would become unnecessary.
Positive results have been associated with the NRM’s efforts to advance the role of women in parliament.
The NRM is credited with leading efforts to place women in parliament. During debates over the 1995
constitution, the NRM accepted a one-third reservation of seats for women on all local government
councils in exchange for the political support of the Constituent Assembly Women’s Caucus on other
issues.318 Currently, women hold 25% of the seats in the national parliament. As noted above, Uganda’s
Constitution establishes quotas and reserved seats as a means of affirmative action and for redressing the
historical disadvantages faced by women and the disabled.
Byanyima, a female Ugandan MP, has commented that the NRM exhibited an early openness to discussing
gender issues, despite the absence of “enlightened” gender perspectives at that time.319 However
progressive Ugandan leadership has become, the rural and patriarchal parts of society remain opposed to
progressive changes. Therefore, though women retain physical seats in parliament, they typically receive
little support from their “progressive” male colleagues.320 Further, because women are elected by special
districts, not interest groups as is the case for youth, workers and people with disabilities, women do not
represent a specific female constituency. Some argue that this is problematic, insofar as the purpose of
affirmative action is to “increase women’s voice in parliament” not to create special representation for
them. Along these lines, female MPs do not consider themselves to be representing women’s issues nor are
they held accountable to women. In 2006, Uganda is expected to transition to a multiparty system.321
Guaranteed electoral seating inspires much debate and an equal amount of praise. While many agree that it
is a quick and dirty way to infuse state parliaments with greater representativeness, the value of those
representatives elected under this system remains questionable. As demonstrated from the cocktail of
overviews, the structure of guaranteed electoral seats can be multifaceted. Adaptability to country specific
issues appears to be the pearl inherent in this arguably favored mechanism.
ADVISORY BODIES
Advisory bodies constitute another form of special representation. When discussed in terms of their
relationship or role in a legislative capacity, they are generically defined as an independent body charged
with consulting the legislature.322 However, these bodies usually have significantly less power than the
lower house of a bicameral legislature. Though advisory bodies are presumably intended to be an integral
part of the decision making process, in the African context, this does not appear to be the case. In Africa the
role of an advisory body such as a house of traditional leaders or second chamber is typically restricted to
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advising. The issues an advisory body consults the parliament on are unique to their individual mandate,
though typically their focus is narrow in scope. The legislature may be obliged to consult the advisory body
only on matters affecting the interests of groups represented by that advisory body.323 Alternatively, an
advisory body may be required to initiate an investigation or present a report to the parliament. In the case
of many African nations, the advisory body represents marginalized groups from various segments of
society such as indigenous people or tribes.324 Creating advisory bodies comprised of traditional leaders
has been a transitional tool used to aid the democratic process while striving not to abruptly abandon and
forsake traditional ways.325 Essentially, these institutions emerged as a form of integrating the old with the
new. Second chambers are another form of advisory body. They are seen as a tool to provide the legislature
with perspectives from a more representative cross-section of society. This type of body promises to
improve integration and more accurately reflect the diverse views and needs of heterogeneous societies in
the decision making process. Occasionally, as is the case in Botswana, the house of traditional leaders may
also serve as the second chamber.
The particular structure, representative capacity and authority assigned to an advisory body may vary
widely across institutions. Members may be appointed or composed of elective representatives of various
groups, as is the case with traditional leaders.326 Advisory bodies may originate from organic grassroots
organizations or be created by constitutional mandate or legislative initiative. Societies employing these
mechanisms may also opt to use any number of additional tools to enhance representational capacity.327
The examples below are used to illustrate methods establishing advisory bodies and elaborate upon their
purpose, shortcomings and realm of influence.
TABLE 4: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ADVISORY BODY
Pro
Con
• Limited authority, usually narrow in scope
• Independent consultative body
• Perpetuates and institutionalizes archaic or
• Legislature or executive consult or may be
“backwards” lifestyles
obligated to consult on specific matters
• Members often are appointed, thereby
• Means for representing particular
compromising democratic function of
interests/issues, often those of
system
marginalized communities
• Legitimizes oppressive behavior and
• Transitional tool used to facilitate moving
customs (ie. sexism, patrimonial/hereditary
to democratic process
leadership)
• Improves integration of diverse views and
• Representatives often fail to advocate on
needs in the decision making process
behalf of their constituency
• Fosters dialogue between different
• Considered discriminatory since privilege
cultural/ethnic groups
is awarded arbitrarily
• Increases value of decisions taken in
• Ill defined duties of representatives
parliament
• Pervasive corruption
Traditional Houses
The idea underpinning a house of chiefs is that all democracies have at least one house in their legislature
representing all citizens on questions of national relevance. Some countries have a second house addressing
more local interests. The house of chiefs (or house of traditional leaders) is intended to reflect local
interests in the legislature.328 Indigenous and tribal groups are typically marginalized populations in large
part due to a lack of infrastructure, resources and representation. Traditional houses are similar to second
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houses and are ideally designed to respond to the needs of indigenous communities’ and advocate on their
behalf. Traditional houses institutionalize forms of traditional governance and, under optimal conditions
one of their functions is to foster dialogue between different ethnic groups.329 In this way, traditional houses
may be a critical and effective tool in conflict resolution.330 Houses of Chiefs in Botswana, Ghana and
South Africa are authorized to advise their respective governments on issues concerning customary rights
and laws. Another way these representatives interact with government is through debate with state officials,
civil servants and judges.331
Despite the optimistic potential of this mechanism, houses of traditional leaders and houses of chiefs are
flawed in multiple ways. For example, because the title and power of chieftaincy is both hereditary and
patriarchicical, it is seen as sexist. It is also thought to go against the democratic grain. In fact, the
constitutional provisions, legislation and mere existence of these institutions are considered discriminatory
since they function to afford certain articulated groups privileges on what is understood by some to be an
arbitrary basis. The responsibilities and duties of traditional leaders is in most cases ill-defined. In short,
these systems are seen by progressives as “backwards”332 and reinforcing outdated lifestyles. Some factions
of society simply wish the “old” ways would surrender to contemporary culture and view this institution as
an enabling mechanism that perpetuates outmoded values. Leaders represented in these bodies are
notoriously ineffective or unmotivated advocates for their constituencies. In fact, there are numerous
instances of corrupt and self-indulgent behavior and an overall lack of effort to use this system to benefit
tribal constituents.
South Africa
Section 184 of the 1993 South African interim Constitution provided a much greater role for traditional
leaders than the final 1996 Constitution. The 1993 Constitution established a Council of Traditional
Leadership and created a framework under which it was to be shaped. This Council consisted of a
chairperson and 19 representatives, who were to be elected by traditional authorities. In addition, the
interim Constitution required that bills relating to traditional customs and laws be reviewed by the Council,
which was armed with a delaying power that could temporarily suspend such bills from being established
as law.333
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognizes the role of traditional leaders334 and provides
that legislation may create institutions at the local, provincial and national levels. Through these
institutions, traditional ways of life may be represented and potentially integrated into decisions relating to
matters of customary rights and laws.335 Specifically, section 211 (1) of the permanent Constitution
recognizes the “institution, status and role” of traditional leaders, though it compromises the 1993
provisions by subjecting the powers to the constitution336 and to subsequent legislation.337 Acknowledging
the function of traditional leaders and including them in decisions affecting their respective communities
may be understood as an effort by the drafters of the constitution to more gently transition from traditional
power to modern democratic reform.338 However, the limiting clause has the effect of narrowing the
capacity of traditional authority. While the extent of the “role and status” has yet to be defined with any
meaningful precision, this situation has given rise to tension between traditional leaders and elected
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officials.339 The most significant reduction in traditional authority (as compared to the 1993 Constitution)
has occurred at the national level, section 212(2)(a) of the final Constitution states the creation of a council
of traditional leaders is optional and that national legislation “may”—but not must—provide for such a
body.340 It is worthy to note that local tribal councils are established under schedule 6 section 25(1)(b) of
the final Constitution. Another important clause to integrate into this analysis is the requirement that the
courts apply traditional and customary laws when relevant.
The Council of Traditional Leaders Act 1997 establishes the Council of Traditional Leaders in section 2(1)
to sec 7(1) which declares that the role of the Council is to “promote the role of traditional leadership
within a democratic constitutional dispensation and enhance unity and co-operation between the council
and various houses and address areas of common interest.”341 Section 7 (2)(a) provides that the Council
may advise the national government and make recommendations relating to matters of traditional
leadership and customary law. It may also conduct its own investigations and advise the President on
request.342 The Council of Traditional Leaders Amendment Act 1998 changed the Council’s name to the
National House of Traditional Leaders.343
Interestingly, the 1996 Constitution fails to delineate the scope of traditional authority or ensure its
integration into the decision making process. From one angle, these legal mechanisms and the institution it
creates provide the building blocks for a venue within which traditional communities may exert greater
influence over their destiny. (Despite this fact that there is no clearly articulated process carved out for their
inclusion.) However, another perspective argues that the nature of the National House of Traditional
Leaders appears to further marginalize the leaders and communities. In other words, the National House of
Traditional Leaders is essentially prevented from influencing society at large. The body also remains
patriarchical, and unwilling to alter this trait. For example, the House of Traditional Leaders rejected
instituting a gender quota. However, it should be noted that two women from Kwazulu-Natal were recently
appointed to be traditional leaders.
Currently, traditional leadership is institutionalized at the local, provincial and national levels. The National
House of Traditional Leaders consists of chiefs sent up from the provincial council. Six provinces (Eastern
Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo Province, Mpumalanga and North West) have Houses of
Traditional Leaders, which elect three members to be representatives in the National House.344 While
National House is said to be loosing power, recent legislation appears to be increasing its embrace of
customary norms.345 Mabutla has commented that “tribalistic ideology” remains the biggest threat to South
African politics.
Uganda
Uganda has not created an advisory body of traditional leaders and in fact the constitution specifically
limits any future political influence of these leaders. Chapter 16 of Uganda’s Constitution recognizes
traditional or cultural leaders. However, section 246(3)(e) provides that no traditional or cultural leader
may take part in partisan politics. Section 246(3)(f) further narrows the authority of traditional or cultural
leaders stating that such leaders may not exercise any legislative or other governmental powers.346 Much of
the focus in this Chapter is placed on ensuring that the role of traditional or cultural leaders will be
constitutionally constrained and that any power will not interfere with other rights accorded to citizens
under the constitution.
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Ghana
Chapter 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana guarantees the institution of “chieftaincy” and
traditional councils.347 Negative rights are assigned to parliament, effectively limiting the legislature’s
ability to revoke any constitutionally derived right of traditional leaders and further ensuring that no law “in
any way detracts or derogates from the hour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.”348 This powerful
constitutional language entrenches the function of traditional leaders. The National House of Chiefs does
not have legislative power, though advises on all matters affecting the country’s chieftaincy and customary
law.349 From a comparative constitutional law perspective, the following excerpt illustrates the important
role ascribed to Ghana’s traditional leaders:
Article 272
The National House of Chiefs shall(a) advise any person or authority charged with any responsibility under this Constitution
or any other law for any matter relating to or affecting chieftaincy;
(b) undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law with
a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and
compiling the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin;
(c) undertake an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view to eliminating
those customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful;
(d) perform such other functions, not being inconsistent with any functions assigned to
the House of Chiefs of a region, as Parliament may refer to it.
Moreso than other African constitutions, the Constitution of Ghana envisions a path for traditional leaders
that both integrates the role of chieftaincies and traditional councils into society at large while preserving
their unique traditional nature. The intricate structure of the House of Chiefs and the support the House
receives from other wings of government firmly root this advisory body into Ghana’s governing system.
Article 271 specifies that members of the National House of Chiefs shall be elected by the House of Chiefs
of each region.350 The process is quite elaborate since there are hundreds of traditional councils which elect
representatives to one of 10 Regional Houses of Chiefs. Of the members in the 10 Regional Houses, five
from each are chosen to be representatives in the National Houses. The Ghanaian government also provides
an administrative staff for the National House of Chiefs and has a Chieftaincy Division in the President’s
Office.351
As mentioned above, one argument against traditional institutions is their inherently patriarchical and
undemocratic nature. Women in particular have taken issue with the lack of gender equality in these bodies.
These inequalities form a common basis for uniting in support of the women’s movement in Africa and for
increasing equitable representation. In southern Ghana, however, women are better represented than in like
systems across the continent. “Queen mothers”, while not exactly representatives, are women who advise
the Chiefs and are considered moral leaders of the community. While this role exists at the grassroots level,
it has yet to penetrate into the upper echelons of the House of Chiefs’ hierarchy.352
Ghana’s National House of Chiefs has assumed an independent lobbying role in promoting long-term
national interests, rather than the special interests advocated by upper houses in other African countries. It
is also said to have played a critical role in helping to transition the country to democracy.353 Prompted by
private investors wishing to purchase land in Ghana, the government undertook an analysis of property
rights. In so doing, it requested the advice of the House of Chiefs, who in turn influenced the outcome of
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the government’s decision to maintain the country’s system of property rights. The House of Chiefs
reasoned that private land ownership would potentially create a landless class and ultimately prove
“socially disruptive”.354
Botswana
Botswana is the oldest and most successful democracy in Africa. The nation has been independent and
democratic since 1966.355 Like traditional leaders elsewhere in Africa, their leadership role is hereditary.
Botswana’s House of Chiefs was established in the 1960s. It was created to marry the new with the old and
gradually introduce ideas of western democracy.356 The institution is enshrined in Part III of the
Constitution and the appointment of the chiefs is spelled out in the Chieftainship Act.357 The House of
Chiefs deal with all customary matters like property, land change and other customary laws and rights.
While the National Assembly is not required to consult the House of Chiefs on general matters, they are
obliged to consult them on matters affecting customary laws and rights. However, the National Assembly
may pass laws without their approval.358 In addition to their advisory role, members of the House of Chiefs
also participate in the judicial system.359 The House of Chiefs in Botswana has the ability to increase
government accountability through its power to compel a cabinet minister to answer questions about his or
her government portfolio.360 Like Ghana, Botswana also has administrative offices designated to support
the House of Chiefs.
Article 85 of the Constitution of Botswana details the tasks assigned to the House of Chiefs, with
provisions similar to those contained in Ghana’s constitution. The House of Chiefs functions include the
ability to address any matter within the country’s legislative or executive authority that it deems important
to “take cognizance in the interests of the tribes and tribal organizations it represents and to make
representation” to the President or National Assembly.361 Also included in this section is the foundation for
the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the House of Chiefs and both the legislative and executive
branches. The language here establishes the building blocks for a culture of inclusion and flexible.
While the House of Chiefs institution appears well structured in Botswana, communities have expressed
dissatisfaction with their representation. For example, one San female representative from the Chobe
district is believed not to be voting on behalf of her San constituency.362 The House of Chiefs initially
represented the eight principle tribes in Botswana. However, during the 1997 review process, communities
expressed the need to increase the number of representatives in the House of Chiefs. Accordingly, in 2001,
a constitutional amendment increased the number of representatives to 15.363 This number is still
considered insufficient by some, specifically those excluded and those seeking an end to “racism”.364 The
Basarwa, a San people, are a marginalized and scattered population of hunter-gatherers that complain of
their lack of representation in the House of Chiefs and the fact that they are not acknowledged as a tribe.365
In 2000, President Mogae appointed a task force to review the House of Chiefs and its constitutional basis.
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The ensuing White Paper on the Balopi Commission proposed to change several constitutional sections to
make them “tribal neutral” however its recommendations failed to be implemented.366
The Second Chamber
The history of second chambers is intimately linked to conflict resolution. These chambers were construed
as a way to balance cultural, ethnic and social instability.367 During a Seminar for Parliamentarians of West
and Central Africa, participants addressed the question of the representative nature of parliaments. This
proceeding stressed the importance for all sectors of society, particularly women and ethnic groups, to be
involved in the decision-making process. Second chambers are established to help satisfy the need for
better integrating different factions of society and making the shift towards modern democracy more
gradual, as witnessed in Burkina Faso.368 Second chambers have also been identified as a type of think-tank
that can function to increase the reliability of decisions taken by parliament.369 African second chambers
are unique in that they are designed to account for “diverse social geography and the need to re-introduce
equality via specific measures and adapted practices, in countries prey to social, racial and cultural
imbalances.”370 For example, importance is given to representation of socio-professional categories in the
Egyptian consultative assembly and the second chambers of Burkina Faso and Morocco.371 However,
unlike second chambers elsewhere in the world, most of these bodies in Africa lack voting powers. The
magnitude of power bestowed upon Ethiopia’s second chamber is extremely rare. African nations that boast
bicameral systems include: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gabon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Namibia, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Swaziland.
Ethiopia
As stated previously, Ethiopia’s legislature is bicameral. The House of the Federation (Yefedereshn Mekir
Bet), Ethiopia’s second chamber, has 112 members (71 of which are appointed by states and 41 are
allocated according to population). Every “nation or nationality” has one seat per one million of its
population.372 Composition of the House of the Federation is not rigid, election of its members may be
direct or indirect and this decision lies with state councils. While this practice allows local nomination
practices and elections of ethnic representatives to be tolerated it also leaves room for abuse. State councils
are free to choose whether elections will be held or whether they will appoint House members. Juxtaposed
with the trends of power dispossession linked to other second chambers in Africa, the House of the
Federation remains relatively powerful and its duties are central to the function of the state. This institution
is facilitating Ethiopia’s move towards democracy, though it remains necessary to have some measure of
checks and balances installed to prevent abuse of power. Though the second chamber was created in 1994,
it was not until 2001 that it gained resources and increased responsibility through a special government
proclamation. This proclamation grew out of a power struggle in the ruling party and resulted in a scale
back of power in the Prime Minister’s Office.373
Arguably, the House of the Federation has too many duties within its purview. It is responsible for
interpreting the constitution, determining issues regarding the “rights of nations, nationalities and peoples
to self-determination”, and is also charged with promoting unity through mutual consent. The House must
also resolve disputes between states, divide federal and state tax revenues and set federal subsidies
allocated to states. In addition, it is authorized to order federal intervention if any state violates the
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constitution or endangers the constitutional order.374 Many societal and political changes have been
attributed to the success of the House of Federation. For example, there has been an increase in debates and
resolutions of intergovernmental conflicts and discussions on regional development policies and ethnic
differences. In addition, the House of the Federation has created various groups to help manage “unity in
diversity.” Moreover, the developments within the second chamber appear to be supported by the
government at large.375
Burkina Faso
In December 1995, the constitutionally mandated second chamber of Parliament was installed, completing
the government structure envisioned by the 1991 Constitution.376 The Chamber of Representatives is the
upper house in parliament though its powers do not extend beyond an advisory role. It is comprised of
representatives from all sectors of civil society, including traditional chiefs, NGOs and religious groups.
For example, approximately 30 of the 150 seats in the upper house are allocated to civil society
organizations representing from various special interest groups.377
Swaziland
British conquest of Swaziland in 1903 reduced the King’s role to that of a paramount chief. In 1968, the
new Constitution declared the nation a “constitutional monarch”, and the King regained some of the
original authority bestowed upon him. According to the 1968 Constitution, parliament was independent.
However, in 1973 the King dismantled the parliament, abolished most of the constitution and banned all
political parties.378 In 1978 the King an appointed a “Tinkhundla” (constituencies)379 parliament, however,
its role was merely advisory. The Tinkhundla was organized by Regional Councils according to the four
regions of the country; Hhohho, Manzini, Shishelweni and Lebombo. However, these Regional Councils
were ineffective.380 One of the main problems with the Tinkhundla was attributable to the power imbalance
between the Tinkhundla and the chiefs in Libandla.381 These chiefs were given the power of development
as granted through the Swazi Administration Act 79/1950, direct access to the King and the duty of land
allocation while members of the parliament appeared to be nothing more than talking heads.382
The 1968 Constitution and its 1978 and 1992 amendments provide for a bicameral Parliament with “equal
powers to enact laws”. The House of Assembly consists of 65 members, comprised of 55 members elected
from the 50 constituencies and 10 members appointed by the Head of State. The Senate is composed of 30
members, 10 of whom are elected by the House of Assembly and 20 appointed by the King. The 1992
Establishment of Parliament Order No.1 provides that those appointed by the Head of State in either
Chamber include inter alia Chiefs and Members of the Royal Family383 both on a rotational basis, as well
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as other special interests such as women, youth and members of religious groups based on their
representation in either Chamber.384 In 1993 parliamentarians were directly elected by secret ballot, though
experts ascribed little credibility to these elections. Further undermining this potential system of
representation is the fact that people did not have the right to express complaints to their supposed
representatives.385
Currently, Swaziland is undergoing a constitutional review process. However, critics of the draft
constitution find its provisions will do little to improve on previous parliamentary has been in the
performance. The design of the parliament is of particular concern as approximately one third of the body
is appointed by the King. According to the proposed constitution, the parliament would consist of up to 31
Senators, 20 of whom would be appointed, and no more than 76 members in House of Assembly or second
chamber, 10 of whom would be appointed by the King.386 These figures reflect a slight increase in the
members of both houses. Candidates in the House of Assembly are to be elected at the regional level by
traditional local councils.387 An Electors and Boundaries Commission is established under Chapter VIII of
the Draft Constitution with a mandate for reviewing the boundaries of tinkhundla areas. This same section
further states that special representation will be provided for marginalized groups, with particular emphasis
on representation for women. No particulars are detailed in this regard.388 Swaziland continues to be a noparty state that outlaws political parties.389 This reality leads one to reasonably conclude that the process of
representation is hampered and the ability of disenfranchised groups to express themselves through political
activity is wholly inadequate. Referring to the Libandla as a legislative body appears to be a misnomer, as
its law making function is artificial and it does not possess any independent power. In a 2003 survey, Swazi
voters expressed the desire for “drastic” political change and a hunger for an accountable government.390
Malawi
Section 68-72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi called for the creation of a second chamber of
parliament, or “Senate”.391 The Senate was intended to have 80 members comprised of one from each
District, a Chief from each District, and 32 additional Senators that would be nominated from various
societal groups. These 32 senators would represent women’s organizations, the disabled, individuals from
the health, education, farming and business sectors and from trade unions, as well as individuals based on
outstanding service to the public and religious affiliation.392 The Senate was designed to be part of a system
of checks and balances, to scrutinize the National Assembly. However, the Senate was never established. In
2001, the relevant constitutional sections were repealed, thereby effectively abolishing the idea of an upper
house.393 Although society at large was opposed to this move the government repeatedly diverted funds that
had been allocated for the purpose of setting up the senate.394
Summary of Advisory Bodies
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Although little information on the effectiveness of advisory bodies exists, to date, these bodies do not
appear to be the most useful or effective representation mechanism. Whether it is their historical grounding
in executive manipulation, ill design or the lack of concrete power, of the three mechanisms discussed
herein, appear advisory bodies to have the least amount of political influence and the least effective means
to represent marginalized populations. That said, if constructed and empowered properly, advisory bodies
may still serve a positive function. With greater authority and tools for advocacy, representatives may
better carry out the will of otherwise unrepresented populations. Furthermore, it cannot go unnoticed that
advisory bodies in Africa still reflect a sincere attempt to appeal to mentalities, lifestyles and organization
of traditional communities. Indeed, both second chambers appear an authentic attempt to include local
perspectives in decision making. However, when the very origin of advisory bodies and the constitutional
provisions and legislation through which they were created ascribes narrow and irrelevant duties that may
be overlooked, undermined or simply erased, then true purpose of their existence is brought into question.
The trend in most African nations appears to increasingly diminish the importance of these bodies and to
continue reducing their already minimal relevancy. Though promising in theory, advisory bodies seem to
further incubate and foster mistrust in the legislature and offer little to their constituencies. Ideally these
institutions should add an additional layer of integrity to the law making process and not serve to quiet
disgruntled citizens left outside of the mainstream political process.
Important Components for Structuring Special Representation
The three mechanisms discussed above are by no means exhaustive. Other mechanisms such as minority
veto, special constituencies, national commissions, and ombudspersons395 are other tools that have been
used to create and support special representation. Though historically, many of these mechanisms served to
marginalize groups in the colonial era, they may now be employed to reverse the wrongs of the past and
establish representational balance.
While no cookie cutter blueprint for constructing mechanisms of special representation exists, several basic
principals may be derived from international law, African history and the common objectives of the various
representational mechanisms. First and foremost, there must be recognition that people in a society are
marginalized. It must be acknowledged that minority populations have been willfully or incidentally
excluded from society and face discrimination at the hands of mainstream populations. It is necessary to
recognize that minority views and needs are neither presented nor integrated in public discourse and lack
meaningful avenues of expression. Recognition is the precursor to representing marginalized people. It is
also necessary that there be an unambiguous definition of what groups are being referred to as
marginalized.396 The ICCPR states that the existence of a minority classification is a matter of fact rather
than law and should be based on objective criteria.397 Once a minority group has been identified, it is
critical that earnest political will acknowledge and prioritize the need to take measures towards improving
that group’s marginalized status. Given the history of corruption and skepticism of legislators among many
Africans, the integrity of political will is a critical issue. Accordingly, at this stage a government may chose
to pursue formalized mechanisms for special representation as a remedy for marginalization.
There are several ways political will can be manifested. The most well-regarded measures include
enshrining provisions in the constitution or enacting legislation. Ideally, a provision will be constitutionally
entrenched and its particularities spelled out in legislation. The significance of constitutional provisions
should not be understated. One delegate to the Constitutional Review in Kenya noted that “whether you are
a majority or minority, the Constitution becomes a protecting tool for everybody so that we are all
equal.”398 Another equally astute remark by Commissioner Mutakha Kangu resolved that:
“Constitutionalism is more important than democracy, democracy should be looked at as
just one aspect of Constitutionalim and if there are any circumstances under which
395
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majorities can run away with power and minorities are left with nothing constitutionalism
will step in and say no we must allow majorities their chance but we must also protect
minorities.”399
Additional factors may influence the success of special representation mechanisms. Constitutional and
legislative safeguards create basic rights and a foundation of trust in a society. They also serve to establish
principles and processes to ensure the integrity of representation and confidence in the legislative system.
Securing fundamental rights within the constitution promises the support and protection of efforts aimed at
equitable representation. A freedom of speech clause is a vital component. At least 39 African constitutions
have established a freedom of speech clause within their constitution but 14 remain silent on the issue.400
Equality and non-discrimination clauses are likewise critical constitutional components. Both are illustrated
in the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights which provides:
9 (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect
or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may
be taken.
9 (3) “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one
or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.
9 (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent
or prohibit unfair discrimination.
States may also ensure optimal conditions for voting through acts of legislation or within constitutional
provisions. For example, they may establish political rights by making voting universal and secret,401 as
well as establishing an electoral system and process to be implemented. They may similarly entrench
minority rights and delineate mechanisms for minority representation. Stipulations may also assure physical
and emotional security, economic resources, minimum levels of education and health as well as tolerance
of opposing views.402 Accountability of representatives may be enforced through articulated rules and
sanctions. Independent institutions and/or commissions may be set up to support or enforce these laws. To
effectively implement special representation, minority rights must be secured. Promoting the richness of
ethnic group values, combating political, economic and social exclusion and respecting the rights of ethnic
groups in all matters in line with the fundamental rights articulated in international law is a necessary and
minimum step.403 Ultimately, constitutional, legislative or institutional mandates must be insulated by well
structured rules and regulations that are sufficiently tailored to cater to the particular needs of a given
society.
Ideally, special representation is a stop-gap measure. Many assert that measures must be temporary and
mechanisms abandoned once the marginalized group achieves effective representation. As Kymlicka states:
“In so far as these rights are seen as a response to oppression or systematic disadvantage,
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they are most plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the
need for special representation no longer exists… society should seek to remove the
oppression and disadvantage, thereby eliminating the need for these rights”.404
The ultimate yardstick for success of whichever mechanism is instituted is that the marginalized group and
society at large will no longer have a need for it to exist. In other words, when marginalized interests are
represented and integrated into mainstream decisions and national policymaking processes,405 there will be
no need for special representation mechanisms—at that time everyone will be seen as an equal.
Overcoming the Problems Associated with Special Representation
Numerous problems identified in this report underscore the shortcomings of existing special representation
mechanisms to effectively to improve the situation of marginalized peoples. The following thoughts are
meant to provoke discussion and raise questions as to whether these obstacles are insurmountable and how
mechanisms might be reconceptualized and improved upon.
Special representation has been attacked for being undemocratic. When the essence of a representational
democracy is explored, one uncovers a system whereby representatives are elected by the people to make
decisions on their behalf. Therefore, special representation may be understood as furthering democratic
goals and principals by ensuring that all people are represented, particularly those who have traditionally
been excluded from representation. An issue that must be dealt with simultaneously is how to ensure that
non-minority groups remain engaged in the political process and do not become disenchanted by special
representation. The challenge is how to construct and define these mechanisms so they are understood as
contributing value to the whole of society. To this end, relevant regulations and constitutional provisions
should include specific language to this effect. Public education can also be used to reinforce this policy
purpose.
Decline in legislator quality, bias of legislators, preference in favoring special interest groups over the good
of the whole and the willingness of legislators to bargain along identity lines are only a few of the potential
issues that arise when representatives are elected through special mechanisms. Dealing with the earnestness
of legislators is an understandable concern and the issue must be confronted in the design of the specific
mechanism. There is endless space for innovation in creating the rules that would govern the electoral
system and the mandate of elected representatives. In addition, independent bodies could support the
integrity of the system. For example public interest groups, national commissions and media may be used
to keep representatives in line. Additionally, sanctions against representatives who fail to fulfill their
mandate should be established as a matter of law and enforced by a nonpartisan judiciary.
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing Africa is the entrenched skepticism towards awarding a special
privilege to any group over another. Particularly with the regional goal of a unified African identity, one
might question how special representation may be accomplished. Meaningful efforts to achieve unification
must first listen to and address the problems linked to societal cleavages, thus making representational
issues part of the wider African goal of unity. Marginalized people must first be accepted and included in
the societies in which they live before they may see themselves as part of a unified nation. This report has
not found any evidence indicating that special representation mechanisms lead to a rise in tensions between
groups. More accurately, they lead to additional groups pleading to be included within the special
representation framework. To avert a floodgate scenario, existing and new mechanisms may create an
objective and evenhanded, yet still flexible, list of criteria with which to evaluate group claims. Creating
group qualifications with the use of neutrally acceptable terms, like Botswana’s rural area dwellers
classification, may also help to sidestep issues of ethnic conflict. Additionally, a rotational quality may
compliment the instrument by providing future marginalized communities with an entrenched mechanism
guaranteeing a just opportunity.406 This mechanism it could be structured in such a way whereby when one
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marginalized group cycles out of the system, if need be, another group may fill its place. This may be used
as a way to ensure priority to the most marginalized populations while preserving representational
opportunities for other groups in the future.
Africa is faced with immense challenges across a number of issue areas. Indeed, for special representation
to foster meaningful change, it must be accompanied by systems of social and economic reform. It seems
shortsighted to suspend political issues until problems of poverty, education and sanitation are eradicated.
A more prudent and realistic strategy is to embrace the interconnectedness of these matters and realize the
potential for creative, interconnected solutions. To be certain, legislative mechanisms are but one, albeit a
profoundly significant, angle from which to approach better representing interests of disenfranchised
people. In fact, such mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can exist in tandem with executive,
judicial and other tactics.
Policy Recommendations
This report has surveyed a number of African states to gain a better understanding of the four most
frequently used legislative special representation mechanisms. The following suggestions reflect broad
ideas that offer to contribute to the advancement of special representation systems. These suggestions
encompass areas for future projects that may contribute to enhancing opportunities for expression and
participation among marginalized groups in African societies and thereby help move nations towards
becoming more equitable and just societies.
•

•
•

•

•
•
•

Conduct more comprehensive field based study on special representation. Focusing on the
impact of existing mechanisms and examine relevant judicial rulings, legislative acts as well as
notable improvements where mechanisms exist, the impact on society at large and any related
negative repercussions.
Work with African and international partners to create a knowledge bank of mechanisms
for special representation.
Design and compile an online warehouse of country specific regulatory and constitutional
language, supporting institutions, tactics and successful strategies used to advance special
mechanisms (including their implementation and enforcement), statistical and other
accomplishments, references to supporting organizations, and related data.
Build coalition to draft and publish an advisory booklet on special representation
mechanisms for African governments including:
o Recognizing marginalized groups (specifying neutral and objective criteria that may be
used for determining minority status) and rethinking the way these groups are perceived;
o Sample legislation and other legal means for enhancing systems of special representation;
o Encourage NEW and innovative ideas to fit the needs of each society (as recommended
in the Lund Recommendations407);
o Training guides for legislator; and
o Examples of sanctions that may be adopted and enforced if and when legislators violate
code of conduct (ineffective representation, corruption, bribery, etc.)
Encourage inter-African governmental dialogue on issues of special representation
Lobby for educational directive to include teaching tolerance, cultural awareness, knowledge of
a country’s system of governance, and ways individuals can become politically engaged.
Foster institutional support outside the legislature, including roundtables for drafting
legislation on how to carry out constitutional mandates

Concluding thoughts
Positive things are happening. Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and Zambia each held multiparty elections where an incumbent regime was defeated and peacefully handed over the reigns of power.408
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The National Constitutional Review Process occurring in Kenya has made efforts to involve most
“minority groups” and is striving to offer opportunities to redress previous imbalances through affirmative
action, gender equality, free and compulsory primary education, and devolution of power to lead regions on
human rights issues, the environment, land rights and cultural reforms.409 Women in Mozambique,
Namibia, South African and Uganda fill over 25% of the seats in their respective national parliaments.
That many countries in Africa and around the world employ special mechanisms to give voice to
marginalized peoples evidences a need that has given way to a rising and hopeful trend. The African
experience underscores the fact that no absolute formula for special representation exists. Rather
mechanisms must be built to fit the unique historical and present context of each country. That said, each of
these mechanisms also must satisfy the standard of being well-articulated and malleable. Similarly, the
temporary nature of such mechanisms must be ensured to preemptively address the concern of creating
disproportionate representation, new tiers of privilege and future conflict. To be meaningfully successful,
these tools must also be part of a broader holistic approach to securing better representation for the
disenfranchised. In this respect, willful leadership, supporting institutions, constitutional and legislative
measures and enforcement each have a role to play. This paper offered a peripheral overview of
constitutions and other data, yet did so from a distance. A closer, on the ground examination of special
representation is necessary to more accurately evaluate the status of existing mechanisms and determine
where room for improvement exists.
Several assumptions or observations may be associated with each mechanism and the opportunities under
which they may prove most popular. Proportional representation is most often associated with better
representation of political parties enabling groups outside the status quo to find a means for expression in
parliament. The true nature of a population is more often reflected in a PR system and though this system is
not restricted to any particular classification, groups are often organized around a shared ideology or
ethnicity. Conversely, quotas and reserved seats are respectively linked to more equitable representation of
gender and ethnicity. These methods for manipulating the electoral system represent common tools for
rapidly encouraging diversity in the legislature. In a similar manner, advisory bodies are often used to
ensure that traditional and local ways of life are preserved in modern systems of governance. Though not
exclusively, many advisory bodies echo customary norms and lend a historical and organic balance to—
often externally introduced—institutional change. If infused with integrity and given genuine
representational authority, these bodies also reflect geographically diverse interests and may feed local
sentiments into the national agenda. Finally constituencies are principally connected to ethnicity and
socioeconomic status. While many boundary demarcations have remained essentially static since colonial
times, they still serve as a useful form through which a political party may target their campaign, align their
political priorities and harness support for elections. The increasingly efforts to redraw district lines offers
hope of greater balance either with an eye towards more equitable population distribution or as a means for
temporarily boosting representation for those groups living on the margins of society.
On the whole, proportional representation and guaranteed electoral seats are more common and effective
means by which nations have opted to redress marginalized peoples. In contrast, advisory bodies appear to
have far less credibility and are much more easily manipulated by executive powers. The redrawing of
electoral districts must be further explored in order to provide a meaningful assessment.
Each special representation mechanism offers valuable insights into the questions of minority rights yet
additional study is required for determining their value with regard to long term democratic development in
Africa. Guaranteeing parliamentary seats, for example is a concept familiar to the women’s movement. The
literature on mechanisms used to push women’s representation is much more impressive than that of other
disenfranchised groups. The voices and abilities of other marginalized groups may be enhanced by
learning from the lessons, techniques and accomplishments of the international and Pan-African women’s
fight for increased representation. In a similar manner, the emergence of the advisory body model be used
as a paradigm for merging traditional forms of governance with modern innovation. By further dissecting a
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country’s electoral system and its affects we may better understand how to create a structure that will be
ever more inclusive and promising to future generations. Finally, collecting and analyzing census data may
inform effort to draw district lines that support the notion of equitable representation.
To be certain, many of the endemic inequalities found within the African context existed before the
introduction of any special representation mechanisms. Special representation played no role in ostracizing
groups with like ancestry, physical features or spiritual beliefs. However, special representation
mechanisms may play a critical role in redistributing opportunities of expression and including
marginalized communities in society. In an ideal world these tools would be superfluous. But in our world
the scales of democracy need tipping towards equality.
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Appendix A: Electoral Systems and Advisory Bodies of the Africa
Country

Electoral system of
unicameral legislature or
lower house of bicameral
legislature

Advisory Bodies:
Second Chamber
(upper house)/House of
traditional leaders

# reps

Second chamber

430

Algeria

List PR

Angola

List PR

220

Benin

List PR

83

Botswana

First-past-the-post

Burkina Faso

List PR

Burundi

List PR

81

Cameroon

First-past-the-post

180

Cape Verde
Islands

List PR

79

Central African
Republic

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

85

Chad

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

125

Congo
(Brazzaville)

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

125

Congo
(Democratic
Republic)

First-past-the-post/
combination system

210

Djibouti

First-past-the-post/ party
block

65

Egypt

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

Eritrea

List PR

Ethiopia

First-past-the-post

French Guiana

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

19

Gabon

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

120

House of Chiefs (also
the Second chamber)

47

Second chamber

111

Second chamber

444
130

Second chamber

55

547

Gambia

First-past-the-post

36

Ghana

First-past-the-post

Guinea

First-past-the-post/
combination system

114

Guinea-Bissau

Lists PR

100

Ivory Coast

First-past-the-post/ party
block

175

Kenya

First-past-the-post/
combination system

188

Lesotho

First-past-the-post

Second chamber

65

Liberia

List PR

Second chamber

64

Libya

PR

Madagascar

List PR/combination system

138

Malawi

First-past-the-post

177

Mali

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

147

Mauritania

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

Mauritius

First-past-the-post/ party
block

70

Morocco

First-past-the-post/
combination system

222

Mozambique

List PR

250

Namibia

List PR

Niger

First-past-the-post

Nigeria

First-past-the-post

Papua New
Guinea

First-past-the-post

109

Réunion
(France)

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

44

Rwanda

First-past-the-post

70

Sao Tomé and

List PR

55

National House of
Chiefs

200

--

Second chamber

Second chamber

79

72
83

Second chamber

56

593

Principe
Senegal

First-past-the-post/ party
block

120

Seychelles

First-past-the-post/
combination system

33

Sierra Leone

First-past-the-post

68

Somalia

First-past-the-post

123

South Africa

First-past-the-post/
combination system

Sudan

First-past-the-post

Swaziland

First-past-the-post

Tanzania

First-past-the-post/
combination system

232

Togo

First-past-the-post/ tworound system

81

Tunisia

First-past-the-post/ party
block

163

Uganda

First-past-the-post

214

Zambia

First-past-the-post

Zimbabwe

List PR

National House of
Traditional Leaders

400
275

Second chamber

House of Chiefs

55

150
120

* List of advisory bodies is not intended to be all inclusive.
Sources: World Policy Institute, “Electoral Systems of the World”
<http://www.worldpolicy.org/globalrights/democracy/table-pr.html> (14 May 2004);
Bruch et al., tables 1& 2, forthcoming [check for permission to site]; Jose de Araújo,
“Legislative Branch”, http://www.chame.com.br/world/legislative.html> (25 July 2004).
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Appendix B: Ethnic Reservations
Country

Reservation System in 2003

Burundi

* 60% of National Assembly Tutsi and
40% Hutu and 50% of Senate each Hutu
and Tutsi
Ethiopia
22 of 117 seats in upper house reserved for
representatives of minority nationalities
Mauritius
8 of 70 seats reserved for “best losers”
representing four constitutionallyrecognized ethnic communities
Niger
8 of 83 seats reserved for representatives of
national minorities
Zimbabwe
* 10 seats unofficially reserved for whites
and 10 seats occupied by traditional chiefs
of the 150 seats in parliament
Sources: CIA Factbook; Howard Wolpe. Telephone interview, 7 April 2004.
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Appendix C: Quota systems and Statistic of Female Parliamentarians
Country

Quota for
Women

Rwanda

Constitutional
Quota,
Election Law
Quota
Political
Party Quota
Political
Party Quota
* National
Legislative
Quota

South Africa
Mozambique
Seychelles

Namibia
Uganda

Eritrea
United Republic
of Tanzania

Guinea
Senegal
Burundi
Botswana
Angola
Sierra Leone
Gambia
Democratic
Republic of the
Congo
Zambia

Burkina Faso

Lesotho
Tunisia
Djibouti

Constitutional
Quota,
Election Law
Quota
Constitutional
Quota
Constitutional
Quota,
Election Law
Quota
Political
Party Quota
Political
Party Quota
Political
Party Quota
* Political
Party Quota

* National
Legislative
Quota
* National
Legislative
Quota,
Political
Party Quota
Political
Party Quota
Election Law

Seats in lower
house of
Parliament as
of April 2004
80

Seats filled
by women

% of Women
in Parliament

39

48.8

Rank by IPU
(compared to
global
statistics)
1

400

131

32.8

12

250

75

30.0

15

34

10

29.4

16

72
304

19
75

26.4
24.7

20
26

150

33

22.0

30

295

63

21.4

32

114

22

19.3

41

120

23

19.2

42

179
47

33
8

18.4
17.0

46
52

220

34

15.5

55

124
53
500

18
7
60

14.5
13.2
12.0

57
61
68

158

19

12.0

“

111

13

11.7

69

120
182

14
21

11.7
11.5

“
70

65

7

10.8

72
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Morocco

Swaziland
Mali
Zimbabwe
Sudan

Ghana
Malawi
Gabon

Sao Tome and
Principe
Cameroon
Congo
Cote d’Ivoire
Ethiopia
Togo
Benin
Kenya

Algeria
Nigeria
Chad
Mauritius
Liberia
Madagascar
Mauritania
Niger

Quota
Election Law
Quota,
Political
Party Quota
Political
Party Quota
Election Law
Quota
Regulation

*National
Legislative
Quota

* Political
Party Quota
* Political
Party Quota

Constitutional
Quota,
Political
Party Quota

Political
Party Quota

325

35

10.8

“

65
147

7
15

10.8
10.2

“
78

150
360

15
35

10.0
9.7

79
82

200
193
119

19
19
11

9.5
9.3
9.2

83
85
86

55

4

9.1

87

180

16

8.9

88

129
223

11
19

8.5
8.5

90
“

547
81
83
224

42
6
6
16

7.7
7.4
7.2
7.1

93
94
95
96

389
359
155
70
76
160
81
83

24
24
9
4
4
6
3
1

6.2
6.1
5.8
5.7
5.3
3.8
3.7
1.2

97
98
101
102
104
109
110
118

1

.9

119

Papua New
109
Guinea
*indicates cell contains 2003 information

Sources: International Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliament 30 June 2004,
<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm> (25 July 2004); International IDEA and Stockholm University,
“Global Database of Quotas for Women”, 2003
<http://www.quotaproject.org/system.cfm> (25 July 2004); Mona Lena Krook, “Not All Quotas Are
Created Equal: Trajectories of Reform to Increase Women’s Political Representation”, March 2003,
http://www.quotaproject.org/Conference_papers/Krook_2003.pdf> (25 July 2004);
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